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This thesis is a conceptual exploration of a number of issues 
relevant to the theorisation 0£ suicide. Five research 
questions are addressed. 1. How should suicide be defined? 
It is argued that intentionality is central to an 
understanding of suicide. 
own life intentionally. 
Suicide is defined as ending one's 
2. Why is there a proliferation of 
theories of suicide? Three main sources are identified - the 
complexity of suicide, the existence of different 
disciplines, and the significance of different basic 
theoretical perspectives. 3. Should this theoretical 
pluralism be accepted as normal or should theoretical 
unification be the goal? Theoretical unification is rejected 
because it denies the complexity of suicide, treating it as 
an undifferentiated domain, and imposes one theoretical 
perspective at the expense 0£ others. 4. How are studies of 
the various explanatory factors of suicide shaped by 
different disciplinary concerns and the assumptions made by 
different theoretical perspectives? Different disciplinary 
approaches have focussed on the operation of different 
factors, and theoretical perspectives within each discipline 
offer different understandings of the meaning of such 
factors. The theorisation of suicide must resist the 
fragmentation of disciplines, theoretical perspectives, and 
various reductionisma in order to understand suicide as a 
holistic phenomenon existing at a number of ontological 
levels. 5. Is it possible to develop an integrated overall 
theory of suicide? Different explanations are required for 
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di££erent types 0£ suicide, human behaviour is not law-
governed, and psychological and social reality consists 0£ 
open systems. For these reasons, a global theory 0£ suicide 
is only able to consist 0£ a highly generalised account·o£ 
the range 0£ distal and proximal £actors potentially relevant 
to the range 0£ types 0£ suicide. Wo~k by Shneidman (1985) 
and Maris, Berman and Maltsberger (1992) of£er a basis £or 
such a global theory. 
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Cathy's husband, a Tongan, living in Wellington, hanged 
himsel£ in the basement 0£ the £amily home a£ter saying he 
was going to put the dog out. Why did he do it? 
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Cathy says the basic problem was low sel£-esteem. Her 
husband had a good job, they owned a house, but he still 
£elt he should be doing better £or his wi£e and £amily. 
As depression and bad moods grew .•• he came to £eel they 
would be better 0££ without him (Neville, 1989, August, 
p. 61). 
Howeverp Cathy was not completely satis£ied that low sel£-
esteem in itsel£ £ully explained why her husband committed 
suicide. What other £actors could have been involved? Why 
did he develop such low sel£-esteem? Why did low sel£-esteem 
cause him to commit suicide when others with the same problem 
do not? 
In her continuing search to understand her husband's 
suicide, Cathy visited Tonga (in 1988, the year 
£allowing his death] .•• to learn more 0£ his culture and 
background. Still she looks £or reasons, in spiritual 
and religious areas and in his medical history 
(Neville, 1989, August, p. 61). 
The relatives 0£ suicide victims commonly embark upon a 
search £or the reasons why people kill themselves. Academic 
researchers have also expended a lot 0£ energy in the search 
£or satis£ying explanations £or suicide. They o£ten 
investigate the significance 0£ sociological, psychological 
and psychiatric £actors. However, it has been just as 
di££icult £or them to speci£y clearly the cause 0£ suicide, 
whether it be in the operation 0£ one £actor or the 
interaction 0£ many. 
The rest 0£ this introductory chapter examines the research 
conducted by the Canterbury Suicide Project, the most 
signi£icant empirical study undertaken to date 0£ suicide in 
New Zealand. A number 0£ questions arise out 0£ this 
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examination relating to the di££iculty 0£ explaining suicide. 
They point to the need £or a theorisation 0£ suicide that is 
able to embrace satis£actorily the range and complexity 0£ 
explanatory £actors. At the end 0£ this chapter, £ive 
research questions are £ormulated which are then addressed in 
detail in the rest 0£ the thesis. 
A study a£ the history 0£ suicide patterns in New Zealand has 
been conducted by researchers associated with the Canterbury 
Suicide Project. Their historical study has relied upon two 
main explanatory approaches, one sociological, the other 
psychiatric (Deavoll, Mulder, Beautrais and Joyce, 1993). 
The £allowing account 0£ the project shows how these two 
approaches have been used. 
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As part 0£ preparatory research £or the Canterbury Suicide 
Project, patterns 0£ suicide in New Zealand were examined 
during the 100 years £ram 1889 to 1988 (Deavoll et al., 1993) 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 : New Zealand Suicide Rates, 
Male and Female: 1889 - 1988 
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During this time the rate 0£ suicide by males has been 
markedly and consistently higher than the rate 0£ suicide by 
£emales. For most 0£ the last 100 years the male rate 0£ 
suicide has been £ive times the £emale rate 0£ suicide. The 
£emale rate climbed £ram a low 0£ about 3 per 100 000 in the 
early 1890s to about 6 per 100 000 around the time 0£ the 
Great Depression in the early 1930s and has remained 
remarkably constant since (Deavoll et al., 1993). The male 
rate rose steadily £ram the late 1890s to 1911-1916, then 
stabilised until the dramatic increase in the late 1920s and 
the early 1930s coinciding with the Great Depression. The 
rate £ell until the mid 1960s, but since then the male rate 
has risen at an increasing rate. 
Comparisons with' studies £ram other countries that have 
looked at suicide over the last century reveal interesting 
similarities and di££erences (Diekstra, 1989). The rise in 
suicide rates in Europe and the United States about 1910 
among young men and women is absent in New Zealand and the 
dramatic 1910 peak in total suicide rates in the United 
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States was also not present in New Zealand (Deavoll et al., 
1993). The 1930s peak in overall male suicide rates appears 
to have been present in both New Zealand and the United 
States, as are the low rates a£ter 1945 
1993). 
(Deavoll et al., 
The peak in the New Zealand male suicide rates in the 1930s 
was accounted £or by increased suicide rates among middle 
aged and older men, particularly those in the 45 to 64 year 
ages. However, the current increase in male suicide rates is 
accounted £or largely by increased rates 0£ suicide among 
younger men, those aged 15 to 24 years (Deavoll et al., 1993) 
(see Figure 2). Figure 3 illustrates that among women, the 
most substantial change is again the 15 to 24 year age group 
increases, and the lowering 0£ the 45 to 64 year old and 65 
plus rates over recent years. 
A sociological, macroscopic theory is one explanation o££ered 
by Deavoll et al. (1993) to account £or regional and temporal 










Figure 2: New Zealand Male Suicide Rates 
By Age Group, 1889 - 1988 
(Deavoll, Mulder, Beautrais & Joyce, 1993, p. 82). 
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Figure 3 New Zealand Female Suicide Rates 
By Age Group, 1889 - 1988 
'81 
(Deavoll, Mulder, -Beautrais & Joyce, 1993, p. 83). 
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stems £rom Durkheim's account 0£ anomic suicide, a £orm 0£ 
suicide which results £roman insu££iciency in people's 
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ability to integrate into the societal collective. At times 
0£ economic crisis, there is an increase in activity and an 
ampli£ication 0£ the interacti?n and competition between 
individuals. Deavoll et al. (1993) have suggested that, £or 
some individuals, there is an increasing discrepancy between 
their aspirations and satis£actions, which may be worse i£ 
there has been a prolonged period 0£ economic stability with 
rising expectations 0£ prosperity prior to the crisis. The 
atmosphere 0£ restlessness and dissatis£action £avours the 
growth, in vulnerable individuals, 0£ suicidal ideation 
(Deavoll et al., 1993). 
The use 0£ the Durkheimian sociological approach leads to an 
investigation into links between New Zealand's social and 
economic history and historical patterns of suicide. Around 
the turn 0£ the century, New Zealand was a largely 
agricultural economy in a new colony, £ull 0£ the promise 0£ 
peace and prosperity £or the large numbers 0£ immigrants 
arriving £rom (predominantly) Great Britain, with ready 
overseas markets £or primary produce. Women's su££rage had 
been achieved 15-20 years be£ore and, £rom the outset, New 
Zealand had a secular rather than religious base (Deavoll et 
al., 1993). The Great Depression 0£ 1927 to 1933, however, 
caused enormous social upheaval with high unemployment and 
poverty. Subsequent to this, New Zealand developed an 
advanced social wel£are system and enjoyed 40 years 0£ 
economic prosperity and £ull employment, supplying Great 
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Britain and the world with its agricultural products. The 
oil crisis of the early 1970s, the £ormation of the European 
Economic Community and increasing protectionism in world 
markets has created a substantial constriction in the current 
New Zealand economy with the result that unemployment is now 
higher than even the 1930s and still rising (Deavoll et al., 
1993). Deavoll et al (1993) have pointed out that it is 
difficult to deny that the suicide rates and periods of 
economic recession and unemployment in New Zealand parallel 
each other. 
Employment differentially affects men far more than women and 
it is notable that the female suicide rate has essentially 
remained unchanged by economic upheavals in New Zealand. 
However, Deavoll et al. (1993) have suggested that this 
sociological explanation is not sufficient to explain why the 
1930s peak was due largely to suicides in older men and the 
current peak to suicides in younger men. They have argued 
that, in the last three to £our decades, young men, in 
particular, have been raised with high expectations and 
experienced a continual rise in living standards, which may 
have made them particularly vulnerable to anomie. There is a 
need then to look to the influence of non-sociological types 
0£ £actors to account £or suicide historically in New 
Zealand. 
Deavoll et al. (1993) have supplemented their sociological 
studies by drawing upon a psychiatric approach. In this 
approach, the focus is on psychological disorders and mental 
illnesses, some 0£ which may be traced to biochemical 
origins. Thus the £ocus moves £ram the in£luence 0£ the 
wider social context to the influence 0£ an individual's 
inner psychological processes. 
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Researchers have noted that it is di££icult to know whether 
rates 0£ mental disorder (especially depression and 
alcoholism) have £luctuated over the century in New Zealand, 
but there is increasing data that supports the idea that 
rates of depression are increasing and that it is occurring 
at younger and younger ages (Klerman, 1988; Klerman & 
Weissman, 1989). These birth cohort trends in depression 
have been identified (Joyce, Oakley-Browne, Wells, Bushnell 
and Hornblow, 1990). There is also increasing prevalence 0£ 
alcohol abuse and dependence for each male and £emale cohort 
£ram age 15 onwards in New Zealand, consistent with the 
doubling of national alcohol consumption since 1945 (Wells, 
Bushnell, Joyce, Hornblow and Oakley-Browne, 1991). 
Interestingly, alcohol consumption appeared to decrease 
around the time of the Great Depression, which probably 
reflects the poverty of the time (Deavoll et al., 1993). 
Consequently, this suggests that alcohol was not an 
influential factor in suicide during the 1930s (Deavoll et 
al., 1930). 
Shaf£er (1988) has postulated that, £or teenagers, the 
combination of substance use, depression and conduct disorder 
may be a lethal combination and that increases in the rates 
of these disorders may explain the increase in teen suicides 
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over the last 20 years. Robina (1986) has also shown that 
rates 0£ conduct disorder in the United States may have 
increased over the last 50 years, and a similar pattern 0£ 
increasing conduct disorder is apparent in New Zealand 
(Deavoll et al., 1993). In general, there appears to be more 
di££iculty in identi£ying the signi£icance 0£ psychiatric aa 
opposed to sociological £actors in suicide historically in 
New Zealand, but this is at least partly a £unction 0£ the 
availability 0£ good data. 
Deavoll et al. (1993) acknowledge the sociological and 
psychiatric approaches to suicide are seldom adequately 
integrated. They suggest that £urther examination 0£ trends 
in suicide rates over the last 100 years may assist in 
determining the relative importance assigned to each. In New 
Zealand, the increase in male suicide rates around the 1930a 
and 1980s, and the lower rates between these periods, is 
consistent with the prevailing social, economic and 
employment condition 0£ the society. However, Deavoll et al. 
(1993) conclude on the basis 0£ psychiatric autopsy studies 
that mental disorder is a vital intervening variable. Thia 
conclusion suggests a complex explanatory account of suicide 
which requires careful theorisation of the relationship 
between qualitatively different £actors, that is, between 
£actors usually dealt with by the different disciplines of 
sociology, psychology and psychiatry. 
The Canterbury Suicide Project has also been conducting a 
large-scale study on contemporary suicide in New Zealand. 
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Between 1991 and 1996 the Project had completed approximately 
4,500 interviews with subjects, their families and friends, 
general practitioners, and mental health professionals. The 
suicide sample was collected within the Canterbury region, 
based upon verdict of suicide given by the coroner. Serious 
attempted suicides consisted of individuals who made attempts 
£or which hospital admission £or at least 24 hours was 
required. In addition individuals who made serious attempts 
by methods with a high risk of fatality, such as hanging and 
gunshot, who did not meet the above criteria were also 
included in the serious attempts group. 
The Project has been engaged in two separate but related 
studies of contemporary suicide, one a case-control study of 
suicide and serious attempted suicide, the other a 
longitudinal study of serious attempted suicide. The first 
study uses a multiple group, case-control design in which 
three groups are compared: individuals who have completed 
suicide, individuals who have made serious suicide attempts, 
and an age and gender stratified sample of control subjects 
randomly selected from the electoral rolls for the Canterbury 
region. Those who have died by suicide and those who have 
made serious attempts are compared with control subjects with 
respect to a range of background £actors including, 
psychiatric illness, physical health, social and 
psychological characteristics to the risk of suicidal 
behaviour. A detailed investigation has been made into the 
significance of the two sets of £actors explored in the 
historical study, the sociological and the psychiatric. 
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On the sociological side, Beautrais, Joyce and Mulder (1996) 
examined the risk £actors £or serious suicide attempts in 
young people aged 13 to 24 years. Their sample consisted 0£ 
129 young people who had attempted suicide, contrasted with 
153 randomly selected subjects controlled £or age and gender. 
Their study con£irmed £indings £rom previous research which 
has shown associations between a range of sociodemographic 
£actors and risk of suicidal behaviour in both adults and 
adolescents (Dubow, Kausch, Blum, Reed, and Bush, 1989; 
Petronis, Samuels, Moscicki, and Anthony, 1990). Beautrais 
et al. (1996) £ound that odds of serious suicide attempt were 
elevated among individuals who were less well educated, more 
residentially mobile, and had lower annual incomes than the 
control subjects. However, unemployment was not associated 
with risk 0£ serious suicide attempt when the effects of poor 
educational qualifications, low income, and residential 
change were taken into account. 
The findings 0£ Beautrais et al. (1996) were also consistent 
with other studies which have indicated that a range of 
childhood experiences and family adversities contribute to 
increased risk of suicidal behaviour <Fergusson and Lynskey, 
1995; Smith and Crawford, 1986). The Canterbury study showed 
that when the intercorrelations between family risk factors 
were taken into account, odds of serious attempt were 
elevated among those individuals with histories of childhood 
sexual abuse, low parental care, and poor parental 
relationship. However, when the effects of correlated 
childhood experiences were taken into account, reports of 
high parental control, physical abuse, parental separation, 
parental violence, parental alcohol problems, parental 
imprisonment, poor family economic circumstances, and being 
in care during childhood were not associated with risk of 
serious suicide attempt. 
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In a consideration of the psychiatric dimension of 
contemporary suicide in New Zealand, Beautrais, Joyce, 
Mulder, Fergusson, Deavoll and Nightingale (1996), compared 
the prevalence and comorbidity of a range of mental disorders 
in a consecutive series of 302 individuals who made serious 
suicide attempts and in a series of 1028 randomly selected 
control subjects. The aim was to examine the relationship 
between psychiatric illness and risk of serious suicide 
attempt. A serious suicide attempt was defined as those for 
which the individual required admission to hospital £or more 
than 24 hours for specialised medical and surgical care. 
Figure 4 compares rates of mental disorders in the preceding 
month for those who make suicide attempts and for control 
subjects. The incidence of psychiatric disorder was high 
with 90.1% of those who make serious suicide attempts having 
at least one mental disorder compared to 20% of control 
subjects. It has been frequently reported that approximately 
90% of those who die by suicide have a mental disorder at the 
time of their death, and the present study suggests that the 
prevalence of mental disorder is similarly high for both 
completed suicide and serious suicide attempts. The 
incidence 0£ comorbidity was also high, with 43.4% 0£ those 
who made serious suicide attempts having two or more mental 
disorders, compared to 3.5% 0£ control subjects. 
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Figure 4 includes the odds ratios associated with each mental 
disorder category. (The odds ratio (OR) describes the 
strength 0£ associations between a risk £actor and outcome). 
Figure 4 shows strong associations between a range 0£ mental 
disorders and risk 0£ serious suicide attempt. Those 
individuals with a diagnosis 0£ depression in the month prior 
to the suicide attempt, £or example, were 27.2 times more 
likely to make a serious suicide attempt than those without 
depression. 
Overall, individuals with any mental disorder diagnosis were 
35.3 times more likely to make a serious suicide attempt than 
those without mental disorders. However, Beautrais et al. 
(1996) also suggest that the risk 0£ suicide attempts £urther 
increases with the comorbidity 0£ mental disorders. Figure 5 
illustrates the relationship between the number 0£ mental 
disorders and the risk 0£ a suicide attempt £or members 0£ 
each age-and-gender stratum and £or the total sample. 
For all age-and-gender strata, there was a marked gradient in 
the risk 0£ a serious suicide attempt conditional on the 
extent 0£ psychiatric morbidity. For the total group 0£ 
subjects who make serious suicide attempts, more than one-
hal£ (56.6%, N=171) met the criteria £or two or more 0£ the 
Figure 4 : Rates 0£ Mental Disorder Among Subjects Who 
Made Serious Suicide Attempts and Comparison Subjects. 








Major Depression 187 
Bipolar I or II Disorder 44 
Any Mood Disorder 232 
Substance Use Disorders 
Alcohol abuse/dependence 94 
Cannabis abuse/ dependence 28 
Other drug abuse/ dependence 30 
Any Substance Disorder 
Anxiety Disorders (Panic 71 
disorder, with or without 
agoraphobia; simple phobia; 
social phobia; agoraphobia 
without panic disorder) 
Eating disorders 
Anorexia nervosa 12 
Bulimia nervosa 17 
Any Eating Disorder 22 
Nonaffecitve Psychosis 3 
(schizophrenia disorder, 
psychotic disorder not 
otherwise specified) 
Antisocial Disorders During 93 
Lifetime ( conduct disorder; 
antisocial personality 
disorder) 























































Fiqure 5: Relation 0£ Number 0£ Mental Disorders to Odds 0£ 
a Serious Suicide Attempt, by Gender and Age. 
(Beautrais, Joyce, Mulder, Fergusson, Deavoll & Nightingale, 
1996, p. 1013). 
Men Women 
Age <30 Y cars Age ~30 Years Age <30 Years Age ~30 Years Total Group 
95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 
Number of DSM-lll-R Odds Confidence Odds Confidence Odds Confidence Odds Confidence Odds Confidence 
Disorders Ratio Interval Ratio Interval Ratio Interval Ratio Interval Ratio Interval 
None 1 1· 1 1 1 
One 11.4 4.7-27.4 13.4 5.0-35.8 12.7 5.2-31.1 26.3 11.3-61.5 17.4 11.2-27.1 
Two or more 56.6 21.4-149.5 92.3 32.8-259.6 48.8 19.0-125.2 113.3 44.6-287.9 89.7 55.6-144.7 
six diagnostic categories considered in the analysis, 
compared to 5.1% <N=52) 0£ the comparison subjects. Those 
who had two or more disorders had odds that were 89.7 times 
the odds £or those with no disorder. 
Beautrais (1996) concluded that these results imply that the 
extent 0£ psychiatric comorbidity is strongly associated with 
the risk 0£ a serious suicide attempt. Estimates 0£ 
population attributable risk suggested that elimination 0£ 
all mental disorders considered in the analysis (mood 
disorder, substance use disorders, anxiety disorders, 
antisocial behaviours, eating disorders and nona££ective 
psychosis) would result in a reduction 0£ 76.2% in the total 
number 0£ suicide attempts. 
Studies by the Canterbury Suicide Project have showed that, 
when due allowance was made £or intercorrelations between 
comorbid mental disorders, odds 0£ serious suicide attempt 
were elevated among individuals with diagnoses 0£ a££ective 
disorders, substance use disorders and antisocial disorders 
(Beautrais et al., 1996). However, anxiety disorders were 
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not associated with risks of serious suicide attempt when the 
effects of correlated disorders were taken into account. 
The dominant profile of youthful serious •uicide attempters 
that emerged from the study by Beautrais et al. (1996) was of 
a group of young people who had many disadvantages. In 
comparison with control subjects, their childhoods and 
adolescences were characterised by poor parental care and 
unhappy family circumstances. They lacked formal educational 
qualifications and were poorer, more residentially mobile, 
and more likely to have a depressive disorder, to be abusing 
alcohol and/or drugs, and to have exhibited antisocial 
behaviours. The general impressions conveyed by this profile 
are that medically serious suicide attempts among young 
people are largely the destination of unsatisfactory life 
courses characterised by childhood adversity, limited life 
opportunities as a young person, and the development of 
significant psychiatric disorder. This conclusion is 
consistent with previous observations (Marttunen, Aro, 
Henriksson and Lonnqvist, 1992; Shafii, 1989) that completed 
suicide in adolescents is the termination of long-term 
difficulties and dysfunction. 
The Canterbury Suicide Project researchers concluded that 
their work suggests that suicidal behaviours are multicausal 
in origin (Beautrais et al., 1996). Childhood adversity, 
social disadvantage and psychiatric morbidity make 
significant contributions, both independently and jointly, to 
risk of serious suicide attempt in young people. The 
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Project's approach to date is largely based on the 
identi£ication 0£ meaning£ul explanatory £actors through use 
0£ statistical signi£icance procedures. Such an approach 
cannot in itsel£ elucidate the actual connections between 
various explanatory £actors, only the extent of correlation 
between them which may in fact be due to chance (Sayer, 
1984). How can we identi£y causal associations? How are we 
to understand multicausality? How are the various causes 
actually related to one another in any particular suicide? 
The answers to such questions require recourse to 
theorisations 0£ suicide, explicitly or implicitly. Such 
theories should help to elucidate the role of explanatory 
£actors and their relationship with others. 
Theories which help to elucidate explanations 0£ suicide need 
to be grounded in empirical research on suicide. Their aim 
after all is to assist in an understanding of relevant 
empirical phenomena. On the other hand, empirical studies of 
suicide, such as those conducted by the Canterbury Project, 
risk over-emphasising one £actor and overlooking the 
influence 0£ others 1£ they ignore theoretical issues. 
However, in the theoretical literature on suicide, many 
di£ferent theoretical accounts are offered. Some theorists 
have highlighted a range of social and cultural £actors. 
Others emphasise the significance of psychological problems 
or psychiatric disorders. To some extent, this difference in 
emphasis reflects the influence of the different disciplinary 
concerns of sociology, psychology and psychiatry. In 
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addition, some theories point to the influence of one factor 
as being crucial. Other theories share the conclusion of the 
Canterbury Suicide Project and attempt to combine a number of 
inter-linked factors. Why does this proliferation of 
theories exist? Does it reflect a theoretical confusion in 
the contemporary understanding of the causes of suicide? Or 
does it represent a healthy pluralism arising out of 
contending theoretical perspectives with different 
assumptions? Can all the theories be integrated into one 
overall theory? 
Furthermore, to what extent are all the theories addressing 
the same phenomenon? A depressed man hangs himself. A 
soldier sacrifices his life by throwing himself on an 
exploding grenade to save others. A woman dies after 
climbing out of an overcrowded lifeboat into a freezing 
ocean, in order to free up a place on the boat for her 
daughter. In all three cases, death is self-caused, but are 
all three deaths suicides? Is suicide more than simply 
killing oneself? For example, how important to the 
definition of suicide is intentionality? The soldier and the 
woman did not intend to kill themselves, although they placed 
their lives in danger. Do their deaths constitute suicides? 
Or are they examples of different types of suicides? How 
should suicide be defined? For the Canterbury Suicide 
Project, coroner verdicts of suicide have been used, an 
approach which effectively avoids the problem of formulating 
a satisfactory definition of suicide. 
This chapter began with a consideration 0£ the personal 
response that people like Cathy have to the suicide 0£ a 
loved one. It then moved on to examine the academic search 
£or explanations 0£ suicide as apparent in the work 0£ the 
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Canterbury Suicide Project. A number 0£ questions have been 
raised as a result. These £all into £ive main areas and lead 
to the £ormulation 0£ £ive research questions about suicide 
and its theorisation which are examined in the rest 0£ the 
thesis: 
1. How should suicide be de£ined? 
2. Why is there a proli£eration 0£ theories 0£ 
suicide? 
3. Should this theoretical pluralism be accepted as 
normal or should theoretical uni£ication be the 
goal? 
4. How are studies 0£ the various explanatory £actors 
0£ suicide shaped by di££erent disciplinary 
concerns and the assumptions made by di££erent 
theoretical perspectives? 
5. Is it possible to develop an integrated overall 
theory 0£ suicide? 
Chapter two examines various considerations relevant to 
de£ining suicide, including the meaning and social evaluation 
0£ suicide in history. A de£inition 0£ suicide is then 
of£ered, comprising 0£ four main elements. Chapter two 
concludes with a discussion 0£ di£ferent typologies 0£ 
suicide, which illustrate the complexity of the phenomenon 
but also the different perspectives adopted by typologists. 
The first half 0£ chapter three addresses the second research 
question on the reasons £or the proliferation 0£ theories 0£ 
suicide. This leads, in the second half 0£ the chapter, into 
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a discussion of theoretical pluralism and unification, the 
subject of the third research question. In chapter four, the 
main sources of theoretical pluralism are then given 
attention. These are the subject of the fourth research 
question: the various explanatory factors as approached 
within different academic disciplines from different basic 
theoretical perspectives. Chapter five provides an 
examination of concepts necessary to answer research question 
five which explores the possibility and nature of an overall 
integrated theory of suicide. Chapter six concludes by 





At £irst glance, the concept of suicide seems uncontroversial 
and hardly in need 0£ exploration. Common sense suggests 
that i£ someone has taken their own li£e, then clearly they 
have committed suicide. If a woman jumps £ram a high bridge 
to her death, or a man dies when his depression drives him to 
shoot himself, surely these would count as suicides. 
Upon further considering examples 0£ suicide, it becomes 
apparent that not all cases are as clear as the two examples 
above. Consider a soldier who leaps on a grenade to protect 
others £rem the blast, or a pilot who chooses to stay with a 
falling plane to guide it into an unpopulated area - rather 
than bail out. These cases are also sel£-willed and the end 
result is the same as jumping of£ a bridge or shooting 
oneself. 
It could be argued that the soldier and pilot were offered 
little or no time to consider care£ully their chosen actions, 
however there are other examples in which time plays no part. 
Consider those who starve themselves £or political causes, or 
those who refuse medical treatment - even though their lives 
could be prolonged indefinitely. Some patients may elect to 
die rather than continue to suffer or to impose burdens on 
others. 
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In some clear cases of euthanasia a terminally ill person may 
request at some stage through their illness to receive a 
lethal injection. Other euthanasia cases are more difficult 
to recognise. For example, care-givers may comply with the 
request 0£ a patient £or a massive dose 0£ morphine while 
insisting that the intention is to kill the pain. 0£ course, 
the expected reality is this will kill the patient due to the 
morphine slowing respiration (Mayo, 1992). 
All of the above examples result in death, although not all 
suicide attempts do. Some cases result in the person being 
revived, resuscitated or, £or example, taking too small an 
overdose and regaining consciousness. Suicidal behaviours 
such as these may or may not mean that the person really 
intended to die. One po~nt 0£ debate in the literature is 
whether or not a definition of suicide should focus on the 
person's will to die, irrespective 0£ whether the attempt is 
successful or not. 
There exists a considerable body 0£ literature which debates 
how best to tackle the complexity involved in defining 
suicide. The result is that the explanatory theories that 
have arisen cannot be assumed to be approaching suicide from 
a unified definition. For example one 0£ the earliest 
proposed definitions, developed by Emile Durkheim (1951) 
stated that, "the term suicide is applied to all cases of 
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death resulting directly or indirectly £rem a positive or 
negative act of the victim himsel£ [hersel£J, which he [she] 
knows will produce this result" (1951, p. 44). In contrast 
Jean Beechler (1979) presented a different de£inition of 
suicide in which he included unsuccess£ul attempts. Baechler 
stated "suicide denotes all behaviour that seeks and finds 
the solution to an existential problem by making an attempt 
on the life of the subject" <1979, p. 11). More recently, 
Edwin Shneidman (1985) has returned to Durkheim's emphasis on 
intentional action by de£ining suicide as "a conscious act 0£ 
sel£-induced annihilation, best understood as a 
multidimensional malaise in a need£ul individual who de£ines 
an issue £or which the suicide is perceived as the best 
solution" (p. 203). 
Any definition 0£ suicide is undoubtedly confronted with the 
dif£iculty 0£ trying to include the diversity and complexity 
0£ the phenomenon. When considering these de£initions it 
should be acknowledged that our contemporary cultural value 
system views suicide in a negative light. This may appear to 
be stating the obvious, but the religious and political 
ideologies that influence values and attitudes have not 
always deemed suicide as undesirable. Attitudes towards 
killing oneself have undergone a series of changes throughout 
history, resulting in varied social meanings 0£ suicide 
(Douglas, 1967). 
The current undesirable social meaning that is attached to 
suicide is being challenged once again. This debate is 
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taking place primarily in the controversial arena a£ 
euthanasia. Some advocates £or euthanasia argue that it is 
completely di££erent £ram suicide, while the critics a£ 
euthanasia insist that it is still a £arm 0£ suicide. 
Irrespective 0£ this debate, most agree that there are two 
kinds a£ euthanasia, passive euthanasia or letting die, and 
assisted suicide, which is de£ined as deliberate assistance 
at a suicide attempt at the request 0£ the attempter 
(Pritchard, 1995). Since 1990 the Dutch have made it 
possible to practice both kinds, providing the patient is 
conscious and a second medical opinion is available (Hellema, 
1992). 
Other nations and cultures seem to be less com£ortable about 
legalising euthanasia and appear to be caught in a 
£undamental divide, which sees passive euthanasia as 
acceptable, and the other as unacceptable. This dilemma is 
one 0£ rationality. Gillon (1988) re£erred to the dilemma as 
a bene£it-burden balance, in which the situation calls £or a 
decision as to whether or not a li£e is worth living. For 
some theorists the link between the notion a£ rationality as 
it applies to euthanasia and those who commit suicide due to 
their experience 0£ a lack of hope and great psychological 
pain, is too close £or com£ort (Pritchard, 1995). Some 
theorists have simply re£used to apply the same arguments to 
both euthanasia and other £arms 0£ suicide. But can the 
notion of rationality, as an argument in support 0£ 
euthanasia, also be used to legitimate other £arms a£ suicide 
(Pritchard, 1995)? A number 0£ theorists reject such an 
approach, believing that it enters the realm of moral 
argument which can only be resolved by society at large 
(Mayo, 1992). 
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Further adding to the complexity of the definition of suicide 
are the religious ideologies and the impact they have had on 
the social meaning of suicide. For example, the contemporary 
Christian view that 'thou shalt not kill' includes killing of 
the self, has not remained consistent through time. The 
following section gives a brief historical overview of the 
changes in religious and societal values regarding suicide. 
Suicide has occurred at least as long as human beings have 
kept written accounts of their history (deCatanzaro, 1981). 
Historical writing from literate early civilisations provides 
some records of the incidence of suicide and of attitudes 
toward it (deCatanzaro, 1981). Many of these writings are 
religious in nature and are more concerned with the ethics of 
suicide than with accurately portraying its incidence and 
social ecology (deCatanzaro, 1981). 
Suicide appears to have been quite common in Greek and Roman 
civilisations (Charon, 1972). It was mentioned with some 
admiration in ancient legends, opposed by Pythagoras and 
other early philosophers, and actively encouraged by the 
Cynics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans (Dublin, 1963). 
Honour suicides (to avoid capture, slavery and murder) appear 
to have been frequent among the Greeks, the Romans and their 
neighbours (deCatanzaro, 1981). Farberow (1972) states that 
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suicide in old age and sickness was also generally 
acceptable. Suicide by a widow £allowing her husband's death 
was also not unknown, and o£ten took the £arm 0£ the widow 
stabbing hersel£ on her husband's £uneral pyre (Rosen, 1971). 
deCatanzaro (1981) argued that suicide was rare among the 
Jews, - there are only six instances cited in the Old 
Testament, without any accompanying moral judgement. Samson 
killed himsel£ in the process 0£ killing the Philistines. 
Saul £ell upon his sword a£ter de£eat in battle to avoid the 
ignominy 0£ capture and Saul's armour bearer £allowed Saul's 
example. Abimelech killed himsel£ a£ter being mortally 
wounded by a stone so that his murder would not be attributed 
to a woman. Atipophael hanged himsel£ when his betrayal 0£ 
David £ailed. Zimri burned himsel£ to death £allowing 
capture 0£ the city in which he was besieged (deCatanzaro, 
1981). In the New Testament, the only reported suicide is 
that 0£ Judus Iscariot, who hanged himsel£ (deCatanzaro, 
1981). 
For Jews, the social meaning 0£ suicide was that respect 
should not be paid to the memory 0£ the deceased although the 
person's £amily should be com£orted (Dublin, 1963). Despite 
a general in£requency 0£ individual suicides among Jews, 
there were reportedly some instances 0£ mass suicide, 
especially when persecution was unusually intense (Dublin, 
1963). In 73 A.D., 960 people are said to have killed 
themselves in the £ortress 0£ Masada, when capture by the 
Romans, with the ensuing slaughter 0£ men, rape 0£ women and 
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enslavement 0£ children, was inevitable <Dublin, 1963). In 
1095 in France, many Jews are said to have killed themselves 
to escape torture; 500 committed suicide in York in 1190 to 
escape oppression, while several Jews may have committed 
suicide in Europe during the plague epidemics of the 
£ourteenth century because they were treated as scapegoats 
(Dublin, 1963). 
Among the early Christians, suicide may have been common, 
especially in consequence 0£ severe persecution and it may 
have been viewed quite favourably as martyrdom. By the 
£ourth century St. Augustine categorically rejected suicide 
because it precluded the possibility of repentance and at the 
same time violating the Sixth Commandment, Thou shalt not 
kill. St. Thomas Aquinas elaborated on this view in the 
thirteenth century, proclaiming suicide to be a mortal sin in 
that it was a rejection 0£ the goodness 0£ God because it 
showed a lack 0£ £aith in God's power and usurped God's power 
over li£e and death (Davidson and Neale, 1990). 
Although neither the Old Testament nor the New explicitly 
£orbids suicide, the Western world came to regard it as a 
crime and a sin (Shneidman, 1973). While the Christian 
injunction against suicide seemed to be based on a respect 
£or life (in contrast to the Roman view of life), the 
resulting behaviour was excessive and counter-productive. 
Those individuals who attempted suicide and the family and 
friends of those who committed suicide were usually degraded, 
defamed, tortured and persecuted <Shneidman, 1976). 
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The Reformation and the establishment of the Protestant 
Church brought yet another change. Religious values began to 
emphasise the importance 0£ the individual, especially 
individual reflection and self-consciousness, and 
Protestantism equated wealth with virtue and poverty with 
sin (Shneidman, 1976). As people found themselves not only 
poor but stigmatised for their poverty, philosophers began to 
endorse suicide as a legitimate alternative to an unrewarding 
and unfulfilled life (Shneidman, 1976). 
Other cultures frequently discussed suicide in their 
religious writings also. In India the Brahmins, £or example, 
viewed suicide quite favourably, suggesting that it provided 
a passport to heaven (Thakur, 1963). Although suicide 
occurred in a variety of situations, one particularly 
conspicious form of suicide was suttee, in which a widow 
would kill herself following the death of her husband 
(Thakur, 1963). This practice was quite common in parts of 
the Orient from the time of Alexander the Great, and was 
frequent until this century (Venkoba Rao, 1975). It varied 
in character in different times and places. Often the woman 
would plunge herself into the flames of her husband's funeral 
pyre, although self-stabbing and other methods may have been 
more common (Thakur, 1963). The act was often 
institutionalised, in that pressure or coercion to perform it 
was exerted by others. It should be noted that only some 
acts of suttee can be classified as suicide due to some cases 
being involuntary deaths (Thakur, 1963). 
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In other parts 0£ the Orient, suicide was also common 
throughout known history. Suicide was held in high esteem in 
Buddhist teachings (Dublin, 1963). In China, suicide a£ter 
de£eat in battle, a£ter death 0£ a husband, in insolvency, or 
in dishonour was viewed £avourably (deCatanzaro, 1981). In 
Japan, suicide may have been £airly widespread (Seward, 
1968). The act 0£ hara-kiri was ritualised and 
institutionalised. It was made compulsory as a £arm 0£ 
punishment £or those 0£ noble rank, allowing them to die by 
their own hand rather than at the hand 0£ an executioner 
(Seward, 1968). Hara-kiri was also £requent as a voluntary 
act, occurring in despair, dishonour, or other mis£ortune 
(Iga and Tatai, 1975). 
Even though suicide was considered a valid alternative in 
many cultures, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the 
West had adopted a negative social meaning of suicide. 
Suicide had come to be regarded as a social problem that 
required an explanation. Although the moral debate about 
suicide has occurred through the ages, it was not until 1951, 
with the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, that the first 
systematic and scienti£ic attempt to de£ine and explain the 
phenomenon occurred. 
Bearing in mind the somewhat variable and dynamic social 
meaning 0£ suicide and the range 0£ circumstances whereby 
people commit suicide, it becomes apparent that these issues 
make defining suicide a £ar from simple task. Theorists 
o£ten wrestle with not only de£ining a complex term, but a 
term that to a large extent lacks a precise meaning and is 
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somewhat vague. This vagueness is certainly not isolated to 
de£ining only the term suicide. There are many other terms 
and concepts which prove to be di££icult to de£ine exactly, 
such as a cloud or the wind. Within the literature that 
debates the nature 0£ de£initions, the problem with the 
notion 0£ vagueness is often examined. The £allowing section 
discusses two ways the problem of vagueness directly a££ects 
a definition of suicide and also suggests a way 0£ 
conceptualising the moral and social meaning that is attached 
to suicide. 
A definition articulates the meaning 0£ a term and if a term 
has a precise meaning, a correspondingly precise definition 
is possible <Reber, 1985). The meaning 0£ terms can be 
imprecise in any number of ways, however some theorists 
suggest there are two such ways that have relevance to the 
definition of suicide. 
The £irst 0£ these occurs when a word that appears in the 
definition of some other term is vague. For example, a 
"living person" can be defined as "a person who is not dead". 
But what "dead" means is not always clear. David Mayo (1992) 
pointed out that the pressing need for organs has prompted 
some debate over the definition of "death", especially in 
such cases where a person has been defined as "brain-dead". 
Mayo (1992) questions whether or not such people are alive, 
and if not, why do they receive all that expensive medical 
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attention in intensive care units? This kind 0£ vagueness is 
re£erred to as inherited vagueness, because the term derives 
or inherits its vagueness £ram a vague statement 0£ meaning. 
The second kind 0£ vagueness relevant to suicide relates to 
the £act that the applicability 0£ a term depends on some 
matter 0£ degree. For example, the notion 0£ "wealth" means 
to have a lot 0£ money, but it is not clear as to exactly how 
much would make someone wealthy. The same problem occurs 
with many other terms, such as "cloudy", "lazy", or "young" 
£or example. 
Sometimes inherited vagueness and a lack 0£ degree combine, 
as could be argued with the terms "intention", "intentional" 
and "intentionally" - a cluster 0£ notions that £igure 
predominantly in the de£inition 0£ suicide. The term 
"intentionally", £or example, involves matters 0£ degree. A 
person may do something more or less intentionally (Mayo, 
1992). It is reasonable to suggest that a person can in £act 
have multiple intentions. In many cases some intentions are 
clearer than others and, as Mayo (1992) states, multiple 
intentions £or an individual can all point in the same 
direction or to the same course 0£ action. For instance, a 
person might notice an amazing new car being advertised on 
television, so goes to the car dealers with the intention 0£ 
only having a look, but ends up buying the car. It is 
di££icult to determine whether the person was in "two minds" 
or they went to look at the car with the intention 0£ buying 
it. 
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Inherited vagueness is also a di££iculty in the use 0£ 
"intentionally" in de£ining suicide (Mayo, 1992). Intention 
entails the notion 0£ seeking to attain an end, 0£ behaving 
in such a way as to bring something to a close. There is 
some vagueness about the range 0£ behaviour that will count 
i£ the person is to be regarded as an agent in bringing 
something to a close (Shneidman, 1985; Mayo, 1992). In what 
way and how directly must one's behaviour be linked to an 
event be£ore one can be said to end it? For instance, a 
person may wish to end a £riendship. Their course 0£ action 
may include having an argument with their £riend, or being 
argumentative with signi£icant other people in the £riend's 
li£e, or spreading a £ew rumours, or be£riending someone 
else, or simply withdrawing all investment in the 
relationship, doing nothing and letting the £riendship dri£t 
apart. It becomes di££icult to determine whether some 
courses 0£ action because 0£ their subtlety are as 
signi£icant in bringing something to a close. 
The £allowing section proposes a workable de£inition 0£ 
suicide and attempts to tackle the problems caused by 
vagueness, but £irst the social and moral meaning 0£ suicide 
will be revisited. One way in which the de£inition of the 
term suicide is not vague is that it does not actually 
contain any normative or intrinsic component. Other·words 
such as "cowardice", "racist", or "courage" do contain and 
carry value judgements as part 0£ their very meaning (Mayo, 
1992). By contrast, any value or social judgements that 
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attach to suicide do not attach to it as part 0£ its meaning. 
The claims that suicide should be viewed in a negative manner 
or that suicide is immoral, if they are true at all, Mayo 
(1992) argues, are not so by virtue of the de£inition 0£ 
suicide, but for other reasons, which must be argued 
independently. Cultural, political and religious ideologies 
have indeed varied the connotations 0£ suicide through the 
ages, but this should be distinguished £ram the indi££erence 
0£ the £undamental de£inition of suicide - which historically 
has remained constant. 
Turning back to the euthanasia debate, it was mentioned 
earlier that the social implications 0£ suicide are currently 
being challenged once again. Some argue euthanasia is 
acceptable and others claim it is not. Whatever the 
perspective it is the value judgements that are being 
challenged not the core de£inition of the phenomenon (Mayo, 
19~2). Mayo suggested that because at present anything that 
can be properly labelled as suicide is to be condemned, those 
advocating euthanasia £eel it necessary to insist as part of 
their defense that euthanasia is not suicide. In turn, some 
critics £eel that they need do no more to condemn euthanasia 
than to insist that it is a £arm of suicide (Mayo, 1992). 
Many theorists have suggested that none of this genuinely 
advances the debate about either the morality of euthanasia 
or the morality and rationality of suicide. Instead, such 
discussions run the risk of trading on the general 
presumption that anything that is suicide ought never be 
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encouraged (Boldt, 1989). The following section does offer 
an argument for the inclusion of euthanasia within a 
definition of suicide. However, the main aim of this section 
is to propose a workable definition of suicide and discuss 
the £our elements that comprise this definition. 
The definition being proposed here is that to commit suicide 
is to end one's own life intentionally (Reber, 1985). There 
are four elements to this definition. The first is the 
fatality of suicide, the second is the reflexivity of 
suicide, the third is the £act that the agency of suicide can 
be either active or passive, and the fourth is the 
intentionality involved. 
The fatality of suicide refers to the issue of whether or not 
the person successfully kills themself. A person may attempt 
to end his or her life, and fail. Such a person has 
attempted suicide. Many theorists suggest however, an 
attempt is not a suicide unless it is successful - that is, 
unless the attempt ends in death <Mayo, 1992; Shneidman, 
1992; Maris, 1992). This requirement is not unique to 
suicide, but is general and applies to anything one can be 
said to attempt. Such a distinction should not deny that the 
study of suicidal behaviour will be equally concerned with 
both those who successfully commit suicide and those who make 
nonfatal attempts. Moreover, the field of study also extends 
to people who do not intend to kill themselves, but engage in 
suicidal gestures, with the intention of drawing attention to 
their need £or help (Maris, 1992). 
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The second element of the definition is the reflexivity of 
suicide. This refers to the concept that for a death to be a 
suicide, it must be one's own doing. That is, the death was 
intended by, and then effected by, the person who died (Mayo, 
1992). This does not mean, however, that a person must act 
alone in committing suicide (Maris, 1992). The most 
straightforward kind of assisted suicide involves a person 
who has decided to end his or her life but lacks the means to 
do it alone, and who successfully elicits the assistance of 
another person by openly sharing his or her intentions 
(Maris, 1992). In this case the person assisting becomes the 
agent of the suicidal person, in the sense that he or she 
acts at that person's request. A case can be described as an 
assisted suicide regardless of whether the assistance 
consists only of providing someone with the means or of 
taking a more aggressive role (Mayo, 1992). 
The third element of the definition of suicide is what is 
referred to as the action-inaction distinction. Committing 
suicide usually involves suicidal acts. However, as 
previously discussed, there are cases of people intending 
their own deaths through appropriate types of inaction such 
as failure to take life-sustaining treatments. People can 
commif suici~e by either allowing, refraining from getting 
out of, or suffering situations that will lead to their 
deaths (Maris, 1992). Mayo (1992) argues that it is a 
mistake to focus too much upon whether or not a person acts 
physically, when what is really at issue is what the person's 
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intentions are in behaving as he or she does. 
suicide can either be active or passive. 
The agency of 
The final definitional element is the intentionality of 
suicide. Committing suicide involves intentionally ending 
It is this feature that serves to distinguish 
suicide from accidental self-inflicted death. Although 
medical examiners recognise this distinction, it is often 
difficult to distinguish in practice (Douglas, 1980; Mayo, 
1992). Douglas (1980) suggests that this difficulty leads to 
biases in the statistics of suicide. Some occurrences of 
suicide may not be recorded because of equivocal evidence, 
attempts to conceal the nature of the act by others or the 
suicidal person, or unclear definitions of suicide (Douglas, 
1980). It is possible that some deaths labelled as suicide 
may actually be murders or accidents. 
Mayo (1992) argued that some deaths labelled as suicides may 
not be suicides because the person was undertaking a suicidal 
gesture in which the intention was not to die, but rather to 
express despair or helplessness. Although death was self-
caused in such lethal cases, such persons did not intend to 
die. Mayo (1992) argued there is a clear conceptual 
distinction between suicide gestures and sincere suicide 
attempts, even though distinguishing them in practice can be 
exceedingly difficult. 
Unfortunately, the distinction between genuine suicide 
attempts and mere suicidal gestures does not spell the end of 
either the conceptual or the empirical troubles associated 
with intentionality. 
drawn among cases. 
A three-way distinction remains to be 
The £irst is where death is intended as 
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an end in itsel£, the second is where death is intended as a 
means to an end and the third is where death is not intended 
at all, but £oreseen as a consequence of what is intended 
(Mayo, 1992). 
With regard to where death is an end in itsel£, literature 
suggests that some people may simply decide that they are 
weary of li£e and kill themselves because they long for 
death. They are not suf£ering and their thinking is not 
structured around what they will escape by death. Rather, 
they simply and genuinely wish to be dead and look £orward to 
it - they see death as an end in itself (Mayo, 1992). 
The second intentionality distinction re£ers to cases in 
which people end t~eir lives not because they £ind death 
attractive, but as a means to an end (Shneidman, 1985). 
people who genuinely attempt suicide do so to escape pain 
Most 
(Shneidman, 1985). In these cases suicide means to put an 
end to su££ering that has become unbearable. Although this 
may be the most typical end suicide serves, it is not the 
only possible one. People may kill themselves £or lo£tier or 
much more altruistic ends, such as to spare their families 
problems, to maintain honour, or to £urther or express 
support £or a cause (Wood, 1980). Soldiers or spies provided 
with a quick means £or ending their lives, £or instance, may 
use it to kill themselves as a means to avoiding torture 
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and/or revealing secrets to the enemy (Wood, 1980). People 
may also kill themselves as a means of impressing or hurting 
or getting even with others (Shneidman, 1985). In such cases 
it is argued that death is intended, but as a means to some 
£urther end. 
The third distinction re£ers to where death is not intended 
at all, but is seen as a consequence of the pursuit of ends 
that people value even more than they value their own lives. 
People often risk their lives in dramatic ways to save the 
lives of others. People even pursue life-threatening goals 
when the loss of their own lives is not merely a risk, but a 
virtual certainty. A person may climb out of an overcrowded 
lifeboat into a freezing ocean fully expecting to die, in 
order to save others in the boat. Although such a person 
intentionally embarks on a course of action that will lead to 
death, death is not a direct part of a plan, but an unwanted 
though unavoidable side effect (Mayo, 1992). 
Mayo (1992) argued that these unintended deaths are not 
suicides, even though the person acts intentionally, and even 
kill themselves knowingly by acting intentionally as they do, 
it would be incorrect to say that their intentions are to 
kill themselves. These cases are not rare and they are 
problematic because the phrase "she intentionally killed 
herself" is according to many theorists so crucially 
ambiguous. Lifeboat martyrs do, after all, kill themselves 
while acting intentionally. 
45 
However, pilots who stay with the £alling plane, they do not 
do so in order that they will die. There is a small chance 
they will survive the crash without having their intentions 
thwarted. Similarly, soldiers who leap on grenades and 
survive the experience, either because the grenade £ailed to 
explode or because they survived the blast, su££er no 
£rustration 0£ their goals and hence are not committing 
suicide (Mayo, 1992). By contrast, £or spies who try to kill 
themselves in order to avoid capture, torture or revealing 
secrets to the enemy, their deaths are integral components 0£ 
their plans, and i£ they do not die their plans go unrealised 
(Mayo, 1992). Thus they do commit suicide. Whether or not 
martyrs who starve themselves £or a cause are suicides 
depends upon whether they intend to die £or the cause, or 
whether they are merely risking their lives in the hopes 0£ 
achieving social change (Mayo, 1992). 
The overall discussion on the de£inition 0£ suicide 
illustrates how suicide takes many £arms which makes de£ining 
and classi£ying problematic. As noted in chapter one, the 
Canterbury Suicide Project has avoided the di££icult 
conceptual issues surrounding the de£inition 0£ suicide by 
de£ining their sample in relation to coroners' decisions. In 
doing so, and in not presenting an independently-derived 
definition, they risk the inclusion 0£ non-suicides and the 
exclusion 0£ some suicides. 
However, a workable de£inition has been proposed above - to 
commit suicide is to end one~s own li£e intentionally. It 
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should not be assumed that such a de£inition captures every 
aspect 0£ suicide. What such a de£inition provides is a 
use£ul plat£orm from which to approach the many theories 
which attempt to explain suicide. 
The overall suicidal continuum includes completions, non£atal 
attempts, gestures, partial sel£-destruction, indirect 
suicide, and ideation (Farberow, 1980). Many theorists argue 
that these self-destructive acts and thoughts are 
su£ficiently di££erent £ram one another to require somewhat 
different explanations or independent predictor variables. 
Maris (1992) suggests that there are probably at least as 
many types of suicide as there are explanatory theories of 
suicide. 
Each person who commits suicide has followed a particular 
pathway in their li£e course leading up to that moment. Each 
pathway is a unique combination 0£ experiences, events and 
vulnerabilities which lead to the development 0£ di££erent 
psychological and social responses. However, there are 
different types 0£ suicide which summarise similar individual 
pathways. Given the diversity of the ways, methods and 
reasons a person may choose to commit suicide, many 
researchers have £ocused their attention on classi£ying how 
many types of suicide there are and how they differ. Whereas 
a de£inition 0£ suicide attempts to isolate what is common to 
all suicides, typologies acknowledge and give an account of 
the diversity 0£ suicides. The £allowing section describes a 
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substantial body 0£ literature dealing with the typologies 0£ 
suicide. 
Blumenthal and Kupfer (1990) suggest that amongst the varying 
typologies there may occur some overlap, yet they are each in 
a way unique. Taking the notion 0£ unique suicides to the 
extreme, it could be argued that every individual suicide is 
unique and that no two suicides are the same. Placing the 
concept 0£ absolute uniqueness within the area of suicide 
assessment and prediction creates an obvious dilemma £or 
practitioners. Logically, 1£ all suicidal careers were 
absolutely unique, any one case 0£ completed suicide would 
have little bearing on the dynamics 0£ any other £uture 
suicide. Maris (1992) points out that i£ this is true, then 
the prediction of suicide is virtually impossible. 
Generally, most suicidologists acknowledge that each suicide 
is unique in some aspects but not in every aspect. There£ore 
the notion 0£ absolute uniqueness is usually refuted. 
Continuing with the assumption that suicides do share some 
similarities, there is a large body 0£ literature that 
attempts to group and classi£y types 0£ suicides. Although 
there are many proposed typologies, most suicidologists 
de£ine three or £our basic types 0£ completed suicides and 
two or three subtypes £or each basic type <Maris, 1992). The 
main reason many theorists keep the number 0£ suicide types 
relatively low is to combat the risk 0£ having a sample size 
which is too small to analyse meaningfully <Maris, 1992). 
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However this is not an uncommon empirical concern, especially 
when researching behaviour that is relatively rare. 
The earliest attempts at typologies of suicide consisted 
mainly of systems derived through sociological theories to 
explain epidemiological findings or systems formulated 
through clinical experience to explain clinical observations. 
Durkheim (1951) explored the sociological roots of suicide 
and proposed four types (with seven subtypes and six mixed 
types). The four basic types of suicide were egoistic, 
altruistic, anomic and fatalistic (Durkheim, 1951). Egoistic 
and altuistic suicides are polar types, as are anomic and 
fatalistic suicides. 
Egoistic suicide is committed when a person has too few ties 
to the society and community (Durkheim, 1951). These people 
£eel alienated from others, cut off from the social supports 
that are important to keep them functioning adaptively as 
social beings (Durkheim, 1951). Altruistic suicides, by 
contrast, are viewed by Durkheim as responses to societal 
demands. Some altruistic suicides, such as the hara-kiri of 
the Japanese, are literally required as the only honourable 
recourse in the circumstances. 
Anomic suicides may be triggered by a sudden change in a 
person's relations to society (Durkheim, 1951). A person who 
experiences severe financial reverses may develop a sense of 
disorientation, because their normal way of living is no 
longer possible. Durkheim's fourth type is fatalistic 
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suicide, which occurs when there is a high degree of social 
regulation which may lead to an individual becoming choked by 
oppressive discipline (Durkheim, 1951). 
Neuringer (1962) borrowed from and added to categories 
suggested by several other authors in generating his list of 
twelve classes of suicidal behaviour. These included 
psychotic suicide, accidental suicide, suicidal threats and 
suicidal thoughts, automatisation, chronic suicides, and 
suicides of neglect and manipulation (Neuringer, 1962). 
The American suicidologist Edwin Shneidman has presented 
several systems of classification, each viewing suicide from 
a somewhat different angle. Shneidman (1966) has described 
four orientations toward death: intentioned; subintentioned; 
contraintentioned and unintentioned. Shneidman (1968) also 
devised three types of completed suicides: egotic; dyadic and 
ageneratic. 
Egotic suicides result from an intrapsychic debate 
characterised by what Shneidman saw as a sharply narrowed 
focus of attention. Other theorists have also commented upon 
this focussed attention such as, Neuringer (1964) who 
referred to it as rigid thinking, while Breed in 1972 termed 
it tunnel vision. This attention focus found in egotic 
suicides also exhibits self-denigrating depression or in 
other words, a focus on personal misery to the exclusion of 
any significant others (Shneidman, 1985). The external 
environment, employment, health and the like become 
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secondary; there£ore Shneidman argues egotic suicide is 
essentially psychological not sociological. Shneidman's 
dyadic and ageneratic suicides on the other hand are 
essentially sociological. The dyadic suicide's death results 
£ram unfilled needs or wishes related to the most important 
person in the individual's li£e (Shneidman, 1985). 
is that of the suicide and the significant other. 
The dyad 
Shneidman (1985) ended up recommending against further 
attempts at classification as the proliferation of typologies 
was not proving useful. He also argued that the process of 
constructing typologies was essentially the forcing 0£ a 
biological overlay on a psychological event. He suggested 
instead the explication 0£ the dimensions of suicide as a 
whole. But as Ellis (1988) and Maris (1992) both pointed out 
in rebuttal, di£ferent types of suicide do exist and need to 
be specified in the search for explanation. Different types 
are likely to require different explanations. 
To return to the proliferation of typologies: Devries (1968) 
presented one of the £irst attempts to define dimensions of 
suicidal behaviour that would take into account the form of 
the behaviour (ideation, threat, attempt, or completion), 
together with the individual's psychological status 
(disturbed vs. non-disturbed) and presence or absence of 
prior attempts. This produced a system of ten non-
overlapping types (Devries, 1968). 
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The French social philosopher Jean Baechler (1979) contended 
that there were four general types of suicide (he also 
included nonfatal attempts) which he divided into 11 sub-
types. The four general types were escapist, aggressive, 
ablative, and ludic. In all escapist suicides, the central 
intention is to take leave. Within this category there were 
three sub-types: flight, to avoid an intolerable situation; 
grie£, to deal with loss; and punishment, to atone £or a 
fault. 
Aggressive suicides are directed against another person. 
They consist of four subtypes, vengeance (to achieve revenge 
- to provoke a response or to inflict community opprobrium), 
crime <murder-suicides), blackmail, and finally appeal <to 
cry for help) (Baechler, 1979). 
Baechler's ablative suicides are quite similar to Durkheim's 
altruistic suicide. There are two subtypes, sacrificial (to 
gain a greater value than one's own life) and 
transfigurational (to obtain a heightened state, such as 
religious martyrdom) (Baechler, 1979). 
Finally, ludic suicides are either 0£ two types, the ordeal 
type (to prove something or to solicit the judgement 0£ 
others) or the game type (to play with or to risk one's own 
life) (Baechler, 1979). Farberow (1980) has called ludic 
suicide and other such behaviour an indirect self-destructive 
behaviour. Maris (1992) argues that some suicidologists are 
doubt£ul that risk taking should be called suicide at all, 
since the conscious intention to die is o£ten missing. 
Following on £rem these ideas grew a body 0£ literature 
baaing suicide typologies upon empirical studies. This 
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"second generation" 0£ attempts to classify suicidal 
behaviour consisted of studies rationally classifying 
empirical data from samples 0£ suicides or parasuicides 
(attempted suicides) (Ellis, 1988). Shneidman (1957) derived 
£our types 0£ "suicidal logic" :from suicide notes and 
suggested possible treatment directions for :four 
corresponding types o:f suicidal persons (surcease, cultural, 
re£erred and psychotic). Farberow and McEvoy (1966) studied 
43 suicides and 43 deceased, nonsuicidal control cases and 
described £our types. The suicide cases were predominantly 
classified as "object-loss" and "involutional" types 
(Farberow and McEvoy, 1966). An "egoistic" type was divided 
equally between the two groups, whereas a "medical" type was 
:found primarily among nonsuicidal cases. 
Hanko££ (1979) reviewed in:formation :from 151 cases of 
parasuicide and divided them into three typologies. The 
:first is "stress attempters", who displayed extreme reactions 
to relatively minor stressors, :frequently with anger or 
hostility. Second, "crisis attempters" where those who had 
been :faced with an acute, seemingly insoluble situation, such 
as terminal illness in sel:f or a signi:ficant other. The 
third, "disorder attempters", mani:fested clear-cut 
psychopathology directly related to the attempt. 
Finally, Maris (1981), in discussing his survey data, 
theorised that suicide has only a £ew basic types (£rom two 
to £our), perhaps corresponding to his proposed £our 
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"meanings" 0£ suicide ("escape", "aggressive", "sel£-change" 
or "sel£-giving", and "risk-taking"). Maris (1981) suggested 
that an in£inite number 0£ ideal types 0£ suicide could be 
generated, but that these would £or the most part be 
elaborations on a £ew basic types. 
In addition to the above there has also emerged another 
manner 0£ approach or "third generation" 0£ research which 
bases typologies on statistical methods. The most popular 
has been cluster analysis, a mathematical technique which 
identi£ies unitary elements or clusters 0£ closely-associated 
£actors that account £or the variability in a data set 
<Reber, 1985) • Colson (1973) used cluster analysis to 
classi£y and type 79 graduate students who reported a history 
0£ serious suicidal thinking or behaviour and £ound £our 
"clusters" 0£ reasons £or wanting to die. These were 
"interpersonal loss and loneliness", "health problems", "£ear 
0£ £allure and concern £or the £uture", and "wish to hurt or 
manipulate another person". In a study 0£ suicide 
attempters, Kiev (1976) £ound seven types, ranging £ram 
"suicidal gesture" (minimal lethality with low emotional 
distress) to "acute depressive reaction" (lethal method with 
minimal probability 0£ rescue). In a post-mortem study, 
Bagley, Jacobson and Rehin (1976) £ound three statistically 
independent types which they referred to as "depressive", 
"sociopathic", and "physical illness". 
54 
There is a striking lack of agreement between the typologies 
of suicide. Ellis (1988) has argued that this is 
predictable, given the wide variation in samples studied, 
variables analysed and classification methods used. Some 
studies have examined suicides post-mortem, whereas others 
have focused on ideation or nonfatal acts. Furthermore, 
great inconsistency can be seen in types of data collected 
(demographics, lethality, circumstances surrounding the 
attempt, personality variables, etc.), with a number of 
variables ranging from a few to several dozen (Ellis, 1988). 
The state of disarray in suicide typologies is not due to a 
lack of suggested typology frameworks, as such proposed 
frameworks have appeared with some frequency for over a 
century. Ellis (1988) likens the lack of agreement between 
theorists to the proverbial three blind men touching various 
parts of an elephant and coming up with radically different 
descriptions of the same animal. In this sense, various 
proposed typologies of suicidal behaviour may be equally 
valid and yet inconsistent. 
Given the vast range of suicide typologies and suicide 
theories in general, a pattern or observation emerges that 
suggests the diversity within suicide theories tends to be 
biased according to the disciplines of their creators. For 
example, Durkheim focused on social types, whereas Shneidman 
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and others have taken a psychological or psychiatric 
approach. Maris (1992) argues that it is quite 
understandable that researchers see suicide through their own 
disciplinary glasses. That is, perspectives on suicide and 
types of suicides reflect professional training and biases 
(Maris, 1992). 
Most of the literature on suicide reflects the disciplinary 
biases of sociologists, psychiatrists, or psychologists 
(Maris, 1992). Clearly, there can be theories based on any 
of the other disciplines or subdisciplines (Maris, 1992). 
For example, there are biological, biochemical, genetic, 
endocrinological, neurotransmitter-based, and other such 
explanations of suicide These varying disciplines are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather tend to focus or 
place more emphasis on different aspects of a complex 
phenomenon. 
Typologies of suicide identify different kinds of suicides 
which may require different kinds of explanation. Typologies 
are therefore significant as part of the explanatory process 
required in empirical studies. The Canterbury Suicide 
Project, for example, has not to date dealt with a typology 
of suicide. This may partly be due to the lack of a clearly-
agreed upon typology in the literature. However, without a 
typology the Project will find it difficult to distinguish 
clearly between the different types of suicide. This in turn 
will hamper its ability to provide adequate explanations for 
the differing types. 
The de£inition 0£ suicide discussed earlier in this chapter 
describes the basic elements common to all suicides. The 
various typologies that have just been examined illustrate 
the great diversity 0£ types 0£ suicide. Together the 
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de£inition and the typologies re£1ect a view of the 
conceptual unity of the phenomenon of suicide as well as its 
complexity. 
The di££erent de£initions and di££erent typologies 0£ suicide 
that exist arise out 0£ the emphases that researchers have 
placed on di££erent explanatory £actors. These in turn have 
led to the construction 0£ di££erent theories of suicide, the 




PROLIFERATION AND PLURALISM 
IN THE THEORIES OF SUICIDE 
There is a proli£eration 0£ theories apparent in the study 0£ 
suicide. Many 0£ the theories originate in di££erent £ields 
of knowledge. Furthermore, within each £ield 0£ knowledge 
can be found a number 0£ competing, and perhaps 
complementary, theoretical approaches. The second research 
question formulated in chapter one asks why there is such a 
proliferation 0£ theories. The £allowing brie£ and selective 
account provides some sense of this theoretical diversity, 
followed by an examination of the three main sources of 
proli£eration. Research question three asks whether 
theoretical pluralism should be accepted as normal. The 
second half 0£ this chapter addresses this issue. 
As stated earlier, around the turn of the century, the 
sociologist Emile Durkheim was the first social scientist to 
attempt research on suicide in a scientific manner. 
Durkheim's (1951) fundamental argument was that suicide is a 
reflection 0£ a disturbed relationship between the individual 
and the society in which the individual lives. 
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In 1910, by contrast, Sigmund Freud introduced a completely 
dif£erent argument to account for suicide. It was based upon 
two major hypotheses dealing with psychological phenomena. 
The first hypothesis is an extension of his theory of 
depression and basically views suicide as a form of murder. 
When a person loses someone whom he or she has ambivalently 
loved and hated, and introjects that person, aggression is 
directed inward (Freud, 1967). If these feelings are strong 
enough, the person will commit suicide. Freud's second major 
hypothesis postulates that the death instinct, Thanatos, can 
turn inward and make the person take his or her life (Freud, 
1967). 
Shneidman (1992) pointed out that, since the pioneering work 
of Durkheim and Freud, more than 40 different theories have 
been postulated on the causes of suicide. Some theories 
focus directly upon suicide, while others deal with it 
indirectly. The latter theories, £or instance, address the 
broader context of aspects of psychological functioning which 
are relevant to acts of suicide. 
Two theories which approached suicide within the context of 
broader issues were those of Murray and Pepper. 
(1938) personality theory located explanation in relation to 
a classification of human needs. He argued that the suicidal 
act can be understood only as an action aimed at meeting 
certain needs. By contrast, Pepper (1942) contended that 
suicide is best understood primarily as an existential act of 
despair. In the face of an inability to answer 
satisfactorily existential questions about the meaning 0£ 
li£e and li£e a£ter death, Pepper (1942) suggested that 
people £all prey to chronic despair and ultimately suicide. 
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Among those theorists who have approached suicide directly, 
Henry and Short (1954) draw on the Freudian tradition in 
their psycho-dynamic £ocus on aggression and frustration 
whereas Bunney and Fawcett (1965) promoted another 
explanatory direction by looking to biochemical imbalances in 
the body. Henry and Short argued that aggression is o£ten a 
consequence 0£ £rustration. Usually, to release this 
frustration, an individual will become aggressive towards the 
frustrating person. However, some children develop and 
legitimise a sel£-directed aggression to £rustration which 
can lead to suicide (Henry and Short, 1954). Bunney and 
Fawcett (1965) claimed that the most important causal factor 
in suicide is biochemical imbalances in the body fluids, such 
as in the blood or in the organs such as the brain. 
Soon a£ter, Douglas (1967) returned to Durkheim~s 
sociological notion that suicide should be understood in 
terms of how an individual is estranged or tied to his or her 
society while Beck (1967) continued on in the more 
individualist psychological tradition, drawing on a model of 
depression as an explanatory resource. For Beck, however, a 
cognitive approach was adopted rather than the nee-Freudian 
psycho-dynamic approach. Beck argued that depressed people 
tend to accept personal responsibility £or failures and 
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negative outcomes to such a degree that the sel£-blame often 
leads to desires £or sel£-punishment. 
Among the most recent theories of suicide, diversity 
persists. For example, in 1986, Pfeffer proposed a theory 
relating to suicide being strongly linked to the stressful 
interactions between two people or within a £amily nexus. 
Also in 1986, Roy introduced a theory that placed the cause 
0£ suicide at the physiological level. According to him, 
suicide is an expression of genetic or inborn £actors. 
Lester's (1987) main assertion is that suicide is a learned 
behaviour with childhood experiences and forces in the 
environment playing crucial roles. 
Research question two in the first chapter asks why there is 
such a proliferation of theories of suicide. There are 
perhaps three main sources of proliferation: the complexity 
of the phenomenon 0£ suicide, the influence of disciplinary 
approaches, and the existence of a range 0£ di£ferent basic 
theoretical perspectives. 
below. 
These will be dealt with in turn 
Suicide is a complex phenomenon, consisting 0£ many di££erent 
types that can only be explained by reference to a multitude 
of £actors. As Maltsberger (1992, p. 26) put it, suicide is 
a "multiplex phenomenon". Maris (1992, p. 65) re£erred to 
the "complexity, variability and multidimensionality" of 
suicide. We can expect the development of different theories 
which deal with different types of suicide and with the 
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signi£icance and influence 0£ di££erent dimensions or 
£actors. In other words, suicide is a domain 0£ study which 
consists of a number 0£ sub-domains which require their own 
theoretical explanations. Another level 0£ theory will also 
arise which examines the interaction between various sub-
domains or factors. Levels 0£ theory will be examined 
£urther below. As noted at the end 0£ chapter two, there are 
also a number 0£ dif£erent types of suicide. These di££er 
from one another to such an extent that di£ferent types 0£ 
explanation may be required. Such a view re£lects Barnes' 
(1995) contention that murder-suicides are not all the same. 
She argued that, for example, a murder-suicide involving a 
£ather and his children required a di££erent explanation to 
that involving a husband and his wife. Furthermore, a dozen 
apparently similar suicides can arise out 0£ a dozen 
di£ferent sets 0£ circumstances (Shneidman, 1989). One 0£ 
the implications 0£ such variability in suicide types is that 
no one theory can be comprehensive enough to explain them 
all. 
The second source 0£ the proliferation 0£ theories in the 
study 0£ suicide is the operation 0£ di££erent disciplinary 
approaches. Maris (1992, p. 68), £or example, lists 12 
academic and professional disciplines involved in the study 
of suicide. Each discipline has its own approach or emphasis 
reflecting its own training and focus of concern. In 
relation to understanding the causes of suicide, there are 
four main disciplinary approaches: biological (primarily 
biochemical), psychiatric, psychological and sociological. 
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Each discipline contains sets 0£ theories reflecting its 
emphasis on di££erent aspects 0£ suicide. 0£ten a discipline 
consists 0£ a number 0£ sub-disciplines which in turn contain 
their own theories. One 0£ the moat important theoretical 
challenges £acing the study 0£ suicide is the synthesis 0£ 
the partial views 0£ suicide produced by the di££erent 
disciplines and sub-disciplines. 
The third main source 0£ the proli£eration of theories on 
suicide is the existence 0£ a range of dif£erent basic 
theoretical perspectives. Such perspectives have sometimes 
been re£erred to as paradigms (Davidson and Neale, 1990), 
ideologies (Shames, 1987) and research traditions (Gholson 
and Barker, 1985). They provide a theorist with an 
orientation, with a set 0£ principles (more or less 
systematised) which guide data analysis and theory 
construction. A basic theoretical perspective o£ten 
indicates what is the most significant aspect or issue on 
which a theorist should focus. Such perspectives in 
psychology include structuralism, £unctionalism, 
behaviourism, developmentalism, the cognitive and 
psychoanalytic approaches, humanism, £eminism and, most 
recently, postmodernism (Gergen, 1992; Gergen, 1993; Stagner, 
1988). In other disciplines, similar basic theoretical 
perspectives can be £ound along with additional ones. Some 
0£ the proliferation of theories of suicide can be attributed 
to the influence of basic theoretical perspectives. 
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Another kind of basic theoretical perspective is that 
concerning the nature of science and the kind of scientific 
standards applicable to such disciplines as psychology. For 
example~ psychology has been dominated by a positivist view 
of science which has followed the model of scientific 
explanation in the physical sciences. The physical science 
model has assumed that there is a largely static and singular 
underlying reality which can be described relevantly and 
unambiguously in a scientific language (Lindholm, 1985). It 
has given rise to a quest for cause and effect relationships 
which are seen to be independent of time, space and the 
consciousness of the researcher and the researched (Galtung, 
1977). An empiricist approach to data has been adopted which 
has led to a preoccupation with quantitative methods. Cause 
and effect laws or generalisations have been sought within 
the overall development of theories with hypothetico-
deductive structures. The positivist perspective has often 
resulted in a reductionist account of psychological 
phenomena. Critiques of the adoption of this view of science 
in psychology have arisen from a number of quarters, 
especially humanist and feminist approaches. According to 
them, psychology should adopt the goals and methods of the 
human sciences which reject the determinist and reductionist 
cast of positivism. Realist philosophy of science has been 
one alternative drawn upon by some (Manicas and Secord, 
1983). Such differences in basic theoretical perspectives on 
the nature of science give rise to different theoretical 
approaches to phenomena and contribute to the proliferation 
of theories. 
There is debate over how influential basic theoretical 
perspectives are in scientific study. For example, the 
notion 0£ paradigm, developed by Kuhn (1962 and 1970), 
constitutes the view giving the most influence to basic 
theoretical perspectives. For Kuhn, a paradigm is a 
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disciplinary matrix consisting of a set of basic assumptions 
specifying the sub-universe of scientific inquiry, the 
concepts that will be regarded as legitimate and the method 
that may be used to collect and interpret data. In this 
view, the meaning or import attributed to data depends to 
such an extent on the paradigm that different theories about 
the same phenomenon are taken to be incommensurable when they 
arise from different paradigms. Incommensurabilty means that 
empirical comparison cannot determine which theory is correct 
because, £or instance, what is considered to be legitimate 
data or what is considered to be a valid interpretation of 
data differs so markedly between the paradigms. Empirical 
data are theory-laden, if not to a significant degree theory-
determined. A number 0£ psychologists have rejected the 
relevance of such a notion of paradigm and incommensurability 
to psychology, arguing instead £or a weaker influence £or 
basic theoretical perspectives (Gholson and Barker, 1985; 
Kitchener, 1985; Meehl 1993). In other words, theories 
reflecting di£ferent basic theoretical perspectives may, at 
least sometimes, be compared on an empirical basis and some 
of the key principles of different basic theoretical 
perspectives can be debated in the light of empirical 
evidence. 
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Given the proli£eration 0£ theories on suicide due to the 
three main £actors discussed above, should we expect there to 
remain a pluralism 0£ theories or should it be anticipated 
that a theoretical uni£ication should develop? This then is 
the third research question to be examined in this thesis and 
is the subject of the second ha!£ 0£ this chapter. The 
issues just discussed provide a £ramework £or understanding 
the nature 0£ theoretical pluralism and the possibility of 
theoretical uni£ication. 
Is theoretical pluralism unavoidable? Or is it merely an 
instrument to employ toward the goal of theoretical 
unification or monism? Are both perspectives valid? There 
are two issues that need to be addressed be£ore debating the 
above questions. The £irat centres on the developing 
scienti£ic maturity 0£ psychology while the second concerns 
the di££erent types of theoretical pluralism. 
Many theorists take theoretical pluralism, the absence of 
theoretical uni£ication, to be a sign of the immaturity 0£ a 
science such as psychology. This notion 0£ immaturity 
originates mainly in positivism <Reber, 1985), and has been 
reinforced by the work 0£ Kuhn (1970). Kuhn argued that a 
discipline's theoretical pluralism was evidence 0£ its 
preparadigmatic or protoscienti£ic stage. In a successful 
science, this prescienti£ic period will give way to a 
paradigmatic period 0£ real science in a discipline, in which 
theoretical unification will replace theoretical pluralism. 
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Basic disagreements concerning theoretical, methodological, 
and philosophical issues will be resolved and there will be a 
consensus about these £undamentals (Kitchener, 1985). When 
this occurs, according to Kuhn, psjchology will have become a 
mature science like physics, astronomy, and biology. 
Theorists such as Koch (1974) would go so far as to say that 
theoretical pluralism has resulted in too much conceptual 
confusion and too little consensus, which ultimately means 
that psychology has failed as a scientific endeavour. Other 
theorists have agreed to a point, but have argued that Koch's 
abandonment of a scientific psychology altogether is 
premature. Instead, they advocate that theoretical pluralism 
constitutes a scientific crisis to be resolved with the aim 
of achieving theoretical unification. 
However, some view theoretical pluralism not as a sign of 
immaturity or of crisis. After all, they point out, 
theoretical pluralism does exist within what some refer to as 
the mature sciences (Royce, 1985). So, is it possible for 
psychology to be a mature science even when it contains 
theoretical pluralism? Some theorists have suggested that in 
order to answer this question, the reasons £or a plurality of 
theories existing simultaneously needs to be more closely 
examined. The following section contains a consideration of 
the different types of theoretical pluralism identified in 
the literature and their relevance to an appreciation of 
theoretical pluralism in the study of suicide. 
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Sequential pluralism refers to the way in which, although two 
theories of suicide may exist at the same time, one is in the 
process of being discarded in favour of the new and better 
one. The new theory provides a more accurate account of the 
empirical data on suicide than the old one. Such a view of 
sequential pluralism reflects a positivist view of theory. 
Positivism assumes that a singular static reality exists and 
that scientific knowledge consists largely of an 
unproblematic correspondence between data and theory. This 
is sometimes referred to as naive objectivism (Sayer, 1984). 
A positivist account of scientific progress is one of 
sequential pluralism, implying that it is a characteristic of 
a mature science (Royce, 1985). Realists reject the naive 
objectivist or correspondence view of science and argue that 
the notion of resolving competitive theories by empirical 
study is not as straight forward as it first appears. All 
data are theory-laden and contextual, and knowledge is always 
fallible <Sayer, 1984). In this view, the resolution of 
competing theories of suicide must at least partly depend 
upon a consideration of presuppositional, conceptual and 
theoretical issues. 
Simultaneous pluralism occurs where one theory is not 
discarded in favour of the other, that is, where two 
competitive theories of suicide co-exist for an extensive 
time. This may be the result of a reluctance to accept or 
acknowledge the advances contained in the better theory. On 
the other hand, simultaneous pluralism may arise from the 
inability of either theory to be clearly better and more 
empirically powerful than the other (Royce, 1985). The 
influence of different basic theoretical perspectives may 
account for the difficulties of identifying or accepting 
68 
better theories. The positivists have argued that both types 
of simultaneous pluralism are characteristic of an immature 
science (Hyland, 1985). It is assumed that competitive 
theories of suicide should in £act be resolved by empirical 
study and that pluralism would give way to unification. 
Kuhn (1970) argued that one difficulty of theoretical 
pluralism within an immature science is that all the 
empirical facts appear equally relevant. Theorists of 
suicide have £aced the same difficulty. 0£ all the factors 
potentially relevant to an explanation 0£ suicide, which are 
the most relevant? According to Royce (1985), the difficulty 
0£ deciding which £acts are relevant has resulted in 
psychology in general adopting a basic strategy of stalling 
£or time, because the development of theories with a high 
degree of explanatory power is a slow and difficult process 
which usually requires several generations. 
However, a plurality of theories may not really be 
competitive in that they may not really provide alternative 
explanations of the same phenomenon. They may instead be 
complementary. Complementary theories address different sub-
domains, such as different types of suicide, as opposed to 
the whole domain of suicide. Kuhn (1970) has argued that the 
many theories of an immature science often cover different 
aspects of the domain in question. That is, most of the 
theories are actually complementary even though they appear 
to be competitive. 
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For example, within the theories 0£ suicide, Clark and 
Horton-Deutsh (1992) have emphasised the importance 0£ 
a£fective disorders and substance abuse disorders within 
those who commit suicide. Orbach, Rosenheim and Hary (1987) 
proposed a theory which argued evidence in favour 0£ suicide 
as a result 0£ the ineffectiveness of adaptive coping skills, 
hopelessness, dysfunctional assumptions and dichotomous 
thinking. Both theories seem to be offering different 
explanations for suicide, so they appear to be competitive. 
These two theories may be addressing different sub-domains of 
suicide, as opposed to explaining all suicide. Both theories 
deal with cognitive ability but only one theory deals with 
psychological disorders. It may be argued that although 
these theories appear to be competitive, they are in £act 
complementary. That is, the theory of Orbach, Rosenheim and 
Hary (1987) is not addressing the same type of suicide as the 
theory of Clark and Horton-Deutsh. 
I£ the plurality of the theories are complementary, then 
there arises two possible evaluations of this situation. The 
first is the positivist evaluation that complementarity is 
characteristic of the immature sciences and hence by 
implication is something which should be eventually 
discarded. This viewpoint suggests that a general theory 
should be able to be developed that makes special cases 0£ 
each 0£ the partial or sub-domain theories (Royce, 1985). 
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The non-positivist viewpoint held in psychology suggests that 
scienti£ic explanation 0£ human behaviour should not be 
modelled on the physical sciences. The quest £or a general 
theory on the physical science model should not be imposed on 
a di££erent discipline. Such an imposition does not do 
justice to the diversity 0£ ways 0£ comprehending and 
conceptualising a phenomenon, that is, to the range 0£ basic 
theoretical perspectives that exist and may £urther develop. 
Lindholm (1985) argued that, ironically, any totalising 
perspective ends up providing only a partial view and merges 
into ideology. Thus a general explanatory theory actually 
contributes to the increasing £ragmentation 0£ knowledge. 
"Fragmentation as ideology is denial 0£ context" (Lindholm, 
1985, p. 329). 
The non-positivist view suggests that theorists should not 
seek general explanatory theories but rather conceptual 
£rameworks. Such a viewpoint recognises that social and 
psychological reality is a complex open system that is deep 
and multi£aceted, with the merging 0£ contradictions and the 
resolution 0£ paradoxes <Manicas and Secord, 1983). There 
are distinct limits to the ability 0£ scienti£ic knowledge to 
explain all aspects 0£ a phenomenon such as suicide. Working 
towards a conceptual £ramework instead 0£ one general theory 
is consistent with the notion that research is guided by 
basic theoretical perspectives which determine the selection 
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of topics for research, the selection of methods and the 
manner in which completed research projects are subjected to 
evaluation. 
So in the positivist view, theoretical pluralism is an 
immature state, but maturity arises when a general theory in 
e££ect unifies the plurality. In the non-positivist view, 
theoretical pluralism is much more acceptable and reflects 
the complexity of reality and the limitations of science. 
The third research question set out in the first chapter asks 
whether theoretical pluralism should be accepted as normal or 
whether theoretical unification should be the goal. In 
relation to the plurality of theories of suicide, in the 
light of the above discussion, there are three main points 
that can be made. First, the oversimplistic notion that 
there exists a number 0£ competing theories which attempt to 
explain the same phenomenon, which can ultimately be resolved 
by empirical study, is rejected. This view implies a 
positivist understanding of theory which rejects the validity 
of the influence of basic theoretical perspectives. However, 
it may very well be that competitive theories of suicide 
exist within each theoretical perspective and that a number 
may be discarded in favour of the one which provides the best 
account of the empirical data on suicide as understood within 
that theoretical perspective. 
Secondly, it is acknowledged that the theoretical pluralism 
within suicidology partly arises out of the existence of 
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complementary theories which deal with di££erent sub-domains 
0£ suicide. In other words, di££erent theories deal with 
different types 0£ suicide or with different factors which 
lead to people committing suicide. Of course, very often 
theorists are at least partly guided towards the study 0£ 
certain sub-domains by their disciplinary or sub-disciplinary 
training or by their basic theoretical perspective. The 
pluralism arising out of this set of complementary theories 
re£lects real dif£erences in what is required to understand 
the different sub-domains. A theory which explains one type 
of suicide may not be adequate in explaining another. For 
this reason this kind of theoretical pluralism is positive. 
Some theorists argue that a general theory of suicide should 
be sought, one which encompasses all types of suicides. It 
is later argued that such a general theory can exist only at 
an abstract level and will lack strong explanatory power. 
Thirdly, as already noted above, di£ferent basic theoretical 
commitments underlie much of the theoretical pluralism in the 
study of suicide. These give rise to competing theories 
which may be giving accounts of the same sub-domain or 
phenomenon but which may not share the same understanding of 
what makes a good theory and which methodological principles 
are assumed to be valid. 
In some cases, two basic theoretical perspectives may 
actually be so different from one another that they may 
approach the characteristics 0£ Kuhn's (1970) paradigms 
(disciplinary matrices) and be at least partly 
\ 
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incommensurable. For example, the more critical and holistic 
perspectives, including humanism and feminism, are 
significantly different from the more reductionist and 
determinist perspectives such as classical behaviourism. As 
Gholson and Barker (1985) demonstrated, the differences 
between the cognitive and contemporary behavioural 
perspectives are much less significant. 
Kuhn (1970) referred to the duck-rabbit figure as a 
perceptual demonstration of the point concerning 
incommensurability. The point is that when there are no loci 
where the two percepts overlap, a person either sees a duck 
or a rabbit for varying periods of time, but never some 
combination of the two. Such psychological constructs as 
concepts, symbols, styles and values constitute a contextual 
backdrop from which perception is conceived. This means, 
that one's world view and philosophy of life are also part of 
perceptual processing. The major implication of the 
principle of incommensurability in the context of theoretical 
pluralism is that there is no way to translate fully between 
theories that are generated from different paradigms, thereby 
involving different presuppositions, methods, and exemplars 
<Kuhn, 1970). 
In the case of two or more highly plausible paradigms 
existing at the same time, in order to understand the world 
view of each paradigm, the theorist must make a gestalt 
switch from one to another. However, if the plurality of 
theories arises from a plurality of paradigms, theoretical 
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unification can only arise upon the resolution of competing 
paradigms. Kuhn (1970) referred to this kind of change as 
revolutionary science. The revolution involves a change in 
all aspects, all the way from the underlying philosophical 
assumptio?s to the observed facts. 
Theoretical unification in this case actually occurs as a 
result not only of scientific activity, but also sociological 
and ideological processes within the scientific community 
<Kuhn, 1970). Theoretical unification of incommensurable 
theories is possible only if everyone can be convinced to 
adopt and work from the same paradigm. 
Some theorists live with a tension between acknowledging the 
legitimacy 0£ different basic theoretical perspectives and 
wishing to hold on to the ideal of some form of theoretical 
unification. In some ways, this appears to be giving in to 
radical relativism, that is, it implies that each approach is 
as truthful or valid as another. Royce (1985) has argued 
that this results in mental paralysis, due to the lack of 
ability to ground or base a critique on the theories. 
However, such mental paralysis need not be the outcome, if 
relativism is not assumed to imply a lack of commitment 
(Paterson, 1984). It is possible for theorists to make a 
critical (reflexive) commitment to that theoretical 
perspective which is in accordance with their own personal 
views of reality but in the spirit of tolerance to give room 
to other perspectives which have their own different 
commitments (Paterson, 1984). This should not be seen to 
discourage inter-perspective debate but rather to encourage 
it. 
Two key arguments have emerged in support of the value of 
some form of theoretical pluralism: first, the recognition 
that different types 0£ suicide, and the role of different 
£actors which lead to suicide, may require different 
theoretical explanations; and secondly, acknowledgement of 
different basic theoretical perspectives within academic 
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disciplines. In the next chapter, research question £our is 
examined: how are studies of the various explanatory £actors 
of suicide shaped by different disciplinary concerns and the 
assumptions made by different theoretical perspectives? The 
different £actors that have been considered to be important 
in explaining suicide are discussed within a framework based 
upon four main disciplines, and the influence of basic 
theoretical perspectives on the understanding of these 




DISCIPLINARY FOCI AND 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Almost every theorist of suicide has acknowledged that there 
is a wide range of factors relevant to an understanding of 
suicide (Maris, 1992). However, most go on to deal with only 
a small number 0£ those factors in detail. The £actors that 
a theorist focuses on depends on the theorist's discipline or 
sub-discipline as well as upon the basic theoretical 
perspective. The following discussion of the various 
explanatory factors of suicide is structured in relation to 
the four main disciplinary frameworks that have dominated the 
theoretical literature on suicide: biological, psychiatric, 
psychological and sociological. 
In biology, there have been two main approaches in the study 
of the causes of suicide, the biochemical and the genetic. 
Contemporary biochemical studies began in the 1950s when it 
was observed there was a chemical similarity between the 
putative neurotansmitter serotonin and LSD. This led io the 
suggestion that schizophrenia might be caused by abnormal 
serotonin transmission. In the 1960s, it was recognised that 
the use of reserpine (which depletes brain stores of 
serotonin, noradrenaline and dopamine) could cause severe 
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depression in some cases. At about the same time, 
pharmacologists discovered that monoamine oxidase inhibitors 
(MAOis) and tricyclic compounds 0£ the imipramine type 
(called antidepressants) also inter£ered with turnover of the 
monoamines in the central nervous system. 
These observations led to two hypotheses which were primarily 
about depression. The two hypotheses were referred to as the 
noradrenalin hypothesis and the serotonin hypothesis, both of 
which stated a relationship between depression and 
transmission at certain key sites in the central nervous 
system. 
More recently, two clusters of biological £actors that tend 
to correlate with suicidal behaviour have emerged. The £irst 
is variables associated with a serotonergic transmitter or 
more specifically the monoamine serotonin, 5 hydroxy-
tryptamine (5-HT). The second area where research has 
focussed is in relation to certain endocrine £unctions, 
particularly the release of cortisol and thyrotropin. Aaberg 
(1986) stated that in the period 1958 to 1967 there were only 
five among 1,267 titles on the general topic of suicide that 
dealt with biological subjects. In 1986 there were 152 
references, mostly on biological aspects of depression and 
suicide (Aaberg, 1986). 
Suicidal behaviours, violence and aggression have been found 
to be related to 5-HT levels in both humans and animals, but 
it is not clear whether this is a state or a trait, that is, 
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a cause of such behaviour or produced as a result of (or 
associated with) such behaviour. For instance, the relevance 
of low levels of 5-HT becomes clearer when considering this 
in comparison with life-time suicide trends. It has been 
observed that the incidence of suicide is very low in 
preadolescent children (Pfeffer, 1985). The suicide rate 
then begins a steep rise in early adolescence, reaches a peak 
in late adolescence, where it then plateaus or rises slightly 
during adult life until approximately age 65, at which time 
it begins another dramatic rise (Blumenthal and Kupfer, 
1990). It has been shown from within-group studies in late 
adolescence, middle adult life and the elderly that as 
cerbrospinal fluid <CSF) 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) 
and (5-HT) levels decline, the suicide rate £or these groups 
rise. 
Some data indicate that a number 0£ conditions associated 
with glucose metabolism, corticosteroid metabolism, 5-HT 
metabolism, or neurological disorders may make direct 
contributions to suicidal behaviours. Such glucose metabolic 
conditions include, diabetes or insulin secretion 
disturbances (Linnoila, Virkkunen, Roy and Potter, 1990). 
Cortiscosteroid metabolic conditions include, Cushing's 
disease or a major disturbance in cortisol metabolism (Lewis 
and Smith, 1983). An example of 5-HT metabolic disturbances 
include, carcinoid syndrome and Lesch-Nyhan syndrome 
(Castells, Chakrabarti, Winsberg, Hurwic, Perel and Nyhan, 
1979). Neurological conditions (which may also include 
disturbances in 5-HT metabolism) include disorders such as 
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epilepsy, Parkinson's disease, Cornelia de Lange syndrome and 
Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (Cohen, Shaywitz, Caparulo, 
Young and Bowers, 1978). 
The extent to which aggressive and suicidal behaviours may be 
attributed to £amily instability versus biological variables 
is important £or both pathological and therapeutic 
considerations. Brown, Goyer, Lamparski, Linnoila and 
Goodwin (1988) investigated 36 inpatient military men £ram 
whom aggression ratings, suicidal history, CSF 5-HIAA, and 
histories of eight £actors thought to be related to £amily 
instability were available. Results indicated that those 
whose mean rating 0£ aggressive history was above a normal 
range had a significantly higher £requency of suicide 
attempts, lower levels 0£ CSF 5-HIAA, and higher £amily 
instability scores. Furthermore, those with a history 0£ 
suicide attempts had signi£icantly higher aggression ratings, 
lower levels 0£ CSF 5-HIAA, and higher family instability 
scores. In addition, those with CSF 5-HIAA levels below the 
median had signi£icantly higher aggression ratings and a 
higher £requency 0£ suicide attempts, but did not show a 
significant di££erence in family instability scores. Thus, 
the authors concluded decreased CSF 5-HIAA is not necessarily 
associated with increased family instability, but is 
associated with an increased likelihood 0£ aggressive and 
suicidal behaviours. Those individuals who are aggressive or 
suicidal usually do come from more unstable families. Low 
CSF 5-HIAA or £amily instability alone may not necessarily 
predispose an individual toward aggressive or suicidal 
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behaviours, but i£ both are present, the individual is 
considerably more at risk of evincing those behaviours <Brown 
et al., 1988). 
In the genetic line 0£ approach in biology, contemporary 
theorists have proposed five lines 0£ evidence that it is 
argued support the notion that certain genetic factors can be 
£ound within those who commit suicide. This evidence stems 
£rem clinical studies, twin studies, the Iowa-500 study, a 
study 0£ the Amish and the Copenhagen adoption studies. 
collection 0£ studies showed 5% to 15% of suicides have 
suicides among £irst-degree relatives (Roy, 1992). On 
average, 13% 0£ twins are concordant £or suicide; usually 
they are monozygotic twins <Roy, Segal, Centerwall and 
Robinette, 1990). 
This 
0£ Amish suicides, 20-24% had a history of affective disorder 
(discussed £urther in the psychiatric paradigm) among first-
degree relatives and no suicides (Egeland and Sussex, 1985). 
0£ 57 adoptees who committed suicide in Denmark, a 
statistically significant number had biological relatives who 
committed suicide, but almost none of the adoptee controls 
did <Wender, Kety, Rosenthal and Schulsinger, 1986). Many 
theorists working from this paradigm have suggested that this 
Copenhagen adoption study provides the strongest and most 
compelling evidence that there is a genetic component 
affecting suicide. 
One criticism that the genetic and biochemical studies in 
biology £ace is that their conclusions rest mostly on 
statistical differences between suicidal and non-suicidal 
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individuals. It is important to note that, as 0£ yet, it has 
Many not been discovered what exactly is being transmitted. 
opposing theorists are not convinced that it has been 
effectively demonstrated, for example, that manic-depression 
and alcoholism are genetically transmitted. This implies 
that the assumption that suicide is also genetically inherent 
is suspect. It is suggested one weakness with the genetic 
approach is that the conceptualisations and the evidence in 
this matter are murky and eqivocal. 
There are now many studies 0£ different chemicals and 
dif£erent methods involving enormous energy and thought, 
dozens a£ investigations and hundreds 0£ subjects. Another 
criticism of those who focus on the biochemical aspects of 
suicide is that it is useful to distinguish the task 0£ 
explaining suicide from the task of explaining depression, or 
for that matter schizophrenia and alcoholism. Many theorists 
have argued that suicide and depression are not synonymous. 
Although there is currently much research and development on 
depression, Shneidman (1989) cautions that although it is an 
important goal to try to cure all depression, this in itself 
would not eliminate all suicides. 
It is important to recognise that the various studies of 
biochemical £actors relevant ta suicide are focusing an only 
one aspect of human functioning. A number of scholars have 
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noted that there are distinctly different aspects or levels 
to human functioning. For example, the realist philosopher, 
Bhaskar (1979), refers to the three ontological levels 0£ 
neurophysiological (biochemical), psychological and social. 
He argued that these three levels are irreducible to one 
another even though there are important ways in which they 
are linked (Sayer, 1984). As Manicas and Secord (1983, p. 
402) noted, a "lower-order domain" provides the basis £or the 
existence of some "higher-order attribute" - "£or example, 
our speech apparatus is the basis for the power 0£ speech". 
The implication is that events and processes at the 
biochemical level are necessary £or psychological functioning 
to occur but that psychological functioning is not reducible 
to these biochemical phenomena. There is a qualitative 
difference between the biochemical and the psychological such 
that they ought to be studied in their own right and that 
attempts to make direct causal links between them tend to 
fail. 
The second discipline significantly involved in the study of 
explanatory factors in suicide is psychiatry. Psychiatry is 
a medical specialisation which, although it focuses on the 
biochemical aspects 0£ mental illnesses, has developed 
historically as a distinctive academic and professional 
discipline (Reber, 1985). The psychiatric literature 
contains a formidable and overwhelming number of studies 
which have led to some interesting discoveries. It appears 
that people with mental disorders engage in suicidal 
behaviours more often than the general public, and this 
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finding holds both for completed and attempted groups. The 
increased likelihood of suicide in people with mental 
disorders is significant when all causes of death are 
considered, and is estimated at approximately five times that 
of the general population in the several years after an 
episode of mental health contact (Clark and Horton-Deutsch, 
1992). 
Generally, the affective disorders or mood disorders are the 
ones thought to be most often associated with the highest 
rate of suicide, followed by schizophrenia. There are 
several subgroups within affective disorders which can be 
ranked as follows. Unipolar depression has a higher suicide 
rate than bipolar depression (Modestin and Kopp, 1988), and 
psychotic depressives have a higher rate than neurotic 
depressives (Brent, Kupfer, Bromet, and Dew, 1988). It is 
important to note that a distinction should be made between 
depression as a symptom and depression as a disorder or 
disease. Confusion about this overlap has made it difficult 
for psychiatric studies to reach definite conclusions about 
the association between suicidal behaviours and these 
disorders. Despite these difficulties, psychiatric theorists 
have argued that psychological autopsy studies consistently 
£ind that affective disorders are the most important 
diagnoses related to suicide (Jamison, 1986). 
Even though bipolar depression and neurotic depression 
suicide rates are slightly lower, all the affective disorders 
have higher suicide rates than schizophrenia. Within the 
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schizophrenia category those at most risk are young men. 
Depression and hopelessness are important factors in the 
suicide of those with schizophrenia. Whether this mood state 
is part of the illness process or a secondary depression 
occurring as an adaptation to the illness is not known. It 
is disturbing but important to note that for this group, 
there are some studies that suggest complications with 
antipsychotic medications are partially responsible for the 
high suicide rate (Drake and Ehrlich, 1985; Perris, Beskow, 
and Jacobsson, 1980). 
Substance abuse disorders have been found in 47% of people 
with mental disorders (Helzer and Przybeck, 1988). Substance 
abuse disorder is especially found in those with depression 
also, and is considered to increase the likelihood of 
suicidal behaviour. Those with anxiety disorders and 
depression, also exhibit a higher suicide rate than the 
general population, although some have argued this is still 
the case with anxiety disorders in the absence of depression 
(Sims, 1984). However, one anxiety group differs as those 
diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorders seldom commit 
suicide (Coryell, Noyes and House, 1986). 
A review of 33 studies concluded that 1.5% of patients with 
eating disorders committed suicide, and that 18-29% of 
overall mortality could be attributed to suicide (Gardner and 
Rich, 1988). The importance of these figures is hard to 
assess, because most of the patients in the studies were 
young and it is known that suicide already accounts £or a 
large proportion of mortality in this age group. 
With regard to which disorders have higher suicide attempts 
than completions, as a general rule, personality disorders 
are linked to nonfatal suicidal behaviours rather than to 
suicide. In samples of suicide attempters, depressive 
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disorders (such as dysthymic disorders), personality 
disorders and substance abuse appear most frequently (Tanney, 
1992). 
The psychiatric approach to the understanding of suicide is 
confronted with a similar critique to the biochemical 
approach. The diagnosis 0£ a mental disorder alone is not a 
sufficient explanation £or suicidal behaviour. Not everyone 
who has a psychiatric disorder will commit suicide. 
Shneidman (1989) has argued that it is not possible to die of 
unipolar depression or schizophrenia, whereas it is possible 
to die from suicide. Many psychiatric theorists have 
attempted to address this point by suggesting that a 
psychiatric disorder increases the likelihood of suicide, but 
that this does not mean suicide will occur. One problematic 
area of research within psychiatry is finding this actual 
link between a psychiatric disorder and suicide. Perhaps 
this link cannot be identified and the notion that it exists 
reflects a reductionist approach (Bhaskar, 1979). In other 
words, the different ontological levels may not have been 
conceptualised clearly enough by psychiatry at this point. 
Bhasker (1979), for example, argued that the psychological 
level cannot be explained £ully in terms 0£ the biochemical 
level. Mental events are 0£ a di££erent order than 
biochemical events - they are emergent £ram them and thus 
closely related to them but complete physical cause-and-
e££ect chains cannot be constructed to link both levels 
satis£actorily. 
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The third set 0£ disciplinary studies of suicide, those 
undertaken by psychologists, emphasises general psychological 
£actors which are deemed to be necessary £or a suicide to 
occur. Di££erent basic theoretical perspectives o£ten 
identi£y similar £actors 0£ importance although they tend to 
interpret the £actor in different ways. For example, £our 
£actors in particular have been highlighted as significant 
overall. The first is acute perturbation, that is, an 
increase in the individual's state 0£ general upset. The 
second is heightened hostility, an increase in self-hate, 
shame, guilt, self-blame and overtly engaging in behaviours 
which are against one's best interest. The third is the 
cognitive state constriction, which is recognised as a sharp 
and almost sudden tunnelling of thought processes, a 
narrowing a£ the mind's content. This typically involves a 
truncation a£ the capacity to see viable options which would 
ordinarily present themselves in the mind. Finally, the 
fourth is the idea of cessation, the insight that it is 
possible to put an end to suffering by stopping the 
unbearable flow of consciousness. The last is considered to 
be the igniting element that explodes the mixture of the 
previous three components (Shneidman, 1989). 
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The second £actor, heightened hostility, is of signi£icance, 
for example, to both the psychoanalytic and cognitive 
theoretical perspectives. However, this factor is understood 
in quite a different way from each viewpoint. From the 
psychoanalytic point of view, suicide is disguised murder of 
introjected objects (Menninger, 1938). Heightened hostility 
is thus taken to have originally been directed to an external 
object such as a £ether, mother, lover or spouse. This has 
then been turned against the sel£. From the cognitive 
perspective, however, a negative bias in cognitive processing 
is seen to be significant. It is cognitive processes and 
their disruption that become the focus. With almost all of 
the psychological factors discussed below, different basic 
theoretical perspectives have placed different weightings on 
some as opposed to others or have understood the origin and 
meaning of the factors in different ways. 
Within psychology, suicide is understood not as a movement 
toward death or cessation but rather as an escape £ram 
intolerable emotional pain (Shneidman, 1989). Dif£erent 
basic theoretical perspectives approach the source and 
meaning of this differently. However, the overall assumption 
that the suicide serves as a way of dealing with intense 
psychological pain, or metapain, still remains constant 
<Maris, 1992). 
Many psychological theorists have agreed that the ability to 
cope with stressful life events and losses, particularly 
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during critical periods of the life cycle, is a major factor 
in the development of coping and adaptional skills in 
general. Conversely, it is contended that the absence of 
this ability is an important factor in vulnerability to 
suicidal behaviour. The literature suggests that continued 
success in such coping behaviour may lead to a sense of 
mastery, to a positive attitude toward life and to a sense 
that life is worthwhile (Yufit, 1988). The lack of the 
capacity to cope and to adapt can create doubt as to whether 
life is really worthwhile, or even possible (Yufit, 1988). 
The notion of coping and adapting to change has generated 
much research and focuses around £our general concepts. 
First is the notion that psychological equilibrium consists 
of adequate coping skills, which predominate over a 
vulnerability to stress (Neuringer, 1974). Many theorists 
have suggested that a rigid cognitive style, which an 
individual has developed over the years in dealing with 
different life experiences, is one of the major deterrents 
not being able to develop suitable new options for problem 
solving. Some have suggested that when an inability to 
develop such viable coping options is combined with a loss 
hope, diminished internal resources and weakened ego 
defenses, coping behaviour is often diminished and a sense 




The second concept is a negative time equilibrium which 
arises from a fear of the future plus nostalgia for the past 
(Shneidman, 1985). This refers to the idea that many people 
in times of heavy stress or after sudden loss, experience 
brief and transient suicidal thoughts. However, with an 
individual who is coping, these thoughts will typically be 
displaced by more adaptive options and solutions. When a 
lack of confidence or a lack of resiliency prevents such 
shifts in adaption, "a permanent way out" may seem a 
plausible solution (Farber, 1968). Often found in 
conjunction with this lack of resiliency are two further 
89 
factors. One is a tendency to lack a sense of connectedness 
to belonging (Yufit, 1977), and the other is a perceived 
empty future which hinders coping with the present (Yufit and 
Bongar, 1992). 
The third concept, suggests that a positive time equilibrium 
is a £unction of planned future time orientation and 
acceptance and integration of past time events. This refers 
to a plausible, meaningful connection to past, present and 
future time periods which enhances the coping strengths of a 
person under more-than-usual stress. Being able to shift to 
the past in recalling previous methods of successful problem 
resolution, or to shift to the future in anticipation of an 
ego-enhancing event, provides an important inner resource or 
perspective in coping with problems <Antonovsky, 1981). 
The fourth concept refers to maintaining a vital balance via 
resilient and buoyant coping abilities which dominate over 
vulnerability and loss of a future time perspective. This 
idea assumes that the loss of meaning and perspective in life 
can narrow the possibilities for the development of 
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alternative solutions and may in due time reduce or curtail 
the desire to live (Yu£it and Bongar, 1992). Loss 0£ meaning 
may increase the possibility of sel£-harm or self-
destruction. 
The emotion of hopelessness has also been the subject of much 
research and has been £ound to be more strongly related to 
suicide intent than is depression <Beck, Brown, Berchick, 
Stewart & Steer 1990). Hopelessness may be de£ined as a 
potentially recurring state 0£ negative expectancies (Reber, 
1985). Negative expectations related to the development of a 
suicidal mindset have been shown to include dys£unctional 
assumptions, dichotomous thinking, problem-solving de£icits 
and a view a£ suicide as a desirable solution to li£e 
problems (Beck, Brown, Berchick, Stewart & Steer 1990). 
Although suicides and depressive illnesses tend to run in 
£amilies, it is unclear whether the cause is genetic or 
derives £ram a modelling in£luence. General conclusions may 
be drawn however, regarding the e£fects of the media on 
suicide rates. The more publicity a suicide receives, the 
greater the suicide rate (within that geographic area) with 
teenagers being the most in£luenced (Phillips, Lesyna and 
Paight, 1992). It has been observed that the suicide rate is 
higher £or nonfictional stories than for £ictional suicides 
depicted in the media. On average, the modelling ef£ect will 
be stronger i£ the message is clear, repeated, on the front 
page and the copier can identify with the messenger 
(Phillips, Lesyna and Paight, 1992). 
Another research area that has experienced increased 
attention is the examination 0£ ideation. It has been 
estimated that as many as 75 to 80% 0£ all suicides have 
given presuicidal clues 0£ their intentions (Shneidman, 
1992). The literature suggests attention should be paid to 
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new wills, new or altered li£e insurance policies, giving 
away valued possessions, death or suicide talk, and the like. 
Many theorists have argued that the use£ulness of personal 
documents have a significant place in social science. 
Perhaps the most personal document 0£ all is the suicide 
note. Leenaars (1992) has suggested, the note is the 
unsolicited communication of a suicidal person, usually 
written minutes before the suicidal death. One difficulty 
this £orm of investigation £aces is that what was in the 
suicidal person's mind and what they wrote may be quite 
different. In addition only 12-15% of suicide completers 
actually leave notes (Leenaars, 1992). Despite these 
difficulties, many have argued that it is an invaluable 
starting point for comprehending suicide. 
Overall, the psychological literature on suicide is also 
confronted with the same critique as the first two 
disciplinary approaches. No one has ever died of intense 
emotional pain. The actual link between suicide and 
psychological pain and feeling overwhelmed is once again 
absent. Whether a cause and effect link exists in the 
positivist sense should be questioned. However, intense 
emotional pain remains a significant £actor at the 
psychological level. 
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The fourth discipline that has been significant in studying 
the explanatory £actors relevant to suicide is sociology. 
Sociological studies have been primarily concerned with an 
individual's relationship to others and the social context in 
which they live. Different basic theoretical perspectives in 
sociology place different emphases on a range of issues, such 
as individuals as opposed to social structures. The 
£allowing account focuses upon the main findings coming from 
a variety of perspectives. 
Emile Durkheim's theory (1951) demonstrated the power of the 
sociological approach. As a result of his analysis 0£ 
European data on suicide, Durkheim's typologies emphasised 
the strengths and weaknesses of a person's relationships or 
ties to society. 
Studies of family development in the sociological literature 
(as well as in psychology) have suggested that certain kinds 
of family pathology are related to subsequent suicide as an 
adult (Shneidman, 1971). Studies of families of suicidal 
children have found that the family is often disorganised by 
parental separation, divorce, and stresses of living in a 
one-parent family (Pfeffer, 1986). The suicidal children 
were usually distinguishable from other children by the 
seriousness of family stresses, parental violence and sexual 
abusive patterns (Pfeffer, 1986). 
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Physical illness and alcoholism also seem to be apparent in 
many who commit suicide. Such illnesses can a££ect a 
person's ties to society. Studies have shown that about 35-
40% 0£ all suicides have some signi£icant physical illness 
(de Catanzaro, 1992). Diseases that have been £ound to be 
especially related to suicide include epilepsy, malignant 
neoplasms, gastrointestinal problems and muaculoskeletal 
disorders such as arthritis. In a large series 0£ studies 0£ 
alcoholics, Roy and Linnoila (1986) £ound that on average 18¾ 
of all alcoholics eventually commit suicide. In Robin's 
(1981) St. Louis research, 72¾ of completed suicides were 
either depressed (47%) or alcoholic (25%). No other single 
predictor was present in more than 5% 0£ the suicides (Robin, 
1981). 
Alcoholism is more prevalent among certain occupations, and 
this prevalence influences the suicide rates 0£ these 
occupations. Male physicians and bar-tenders are an example 
0£ this group (Roy and Linnoila, 1986). Also some studies 
have £ound an association with occupational stress and 
downward shifts in the economy increase alcoholism (Herold 
and Conlon, 1981; Layne and Whitehead, 1985). 
There have been a number of studies that have shown a 
statistical linkage between unemployment and suicide (Adams, 
1981; Marshall, 1981; Wasserman, 1983). It has been 
suggested that unemployment triggers certain social processes 
that increase the likelihood of suicide for individuals with 
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high levels of psychiatric morbidity. Two social groups have 
been identified as significantly affected by increased 
unemployment. The first group is older, nonretired male 
workers, who have difficulty obtaining employment during 
periods of economic downturns (Dooley, Catalano, Rook and 
Serxner, 1989). The second group is women who may suf£er 
increased family abuse as a result 0£ increased use of 
alcohol by unemployed partners (Counts, 1987). 
With regard to the causal linkage of occupation and suicide, 
there are many £actors that may influence occupational 
suicide patterns. Occupational suicide is related to 
exogenous conditions, such as economic depressions or 
recessions. Suicide rates have been found to increase during 
such changing social conditions (Araki and Murata, 1987; 
Stallones, 1990). The opportunity structure also influences 
the suicide patterns of di£ferent occupational groups. 
Access to the means of self-destruction influences the 
probability of suicide £or various occupations. For example, 
the highest suicide rate is to be found in medical personnel 
and is partially related to their greater access to drugs 
(Rimpela, 1989). There is also an elevated suicide rate for 
dentists, veterinarians, dental technicians, all of whom have 
access to drugs that are often used to commit suicide 
(Milham, 1983). 
Internal occupational stress may also influence occupational 
suicide patterns (Hilliard-Lysen and Riemer, 1988). With 
regard to physician suicide, there is strong empirical 
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evidence women physicians have a signi£icantly higher suicide 
rate than the general £emale population (Pitts, Schuller, 
Rich and Pitts, 1979). 
Studies in the sociological literature have also £ocussed on 
the relationship between marriage and suicide. It has been 
observed that individuals who are married and have a £amily 
have the lowest suicide rate (Smith, Mercy and Conn, 1988). 
Among white males, suicide rates tend to be highest for the 
widowed, followed by the divorced, single and married (Smith, 
Mercy and Conn, 1988). This tends to be true for white women 
as well. The part played by marital status in suicide is 
mediated through status integration theory (Stack, 1992). 
That is, less frequently occupied statuses and those with 
more role conflict tend to have higher suicide rates. 
Classical religion and suicide studies (e.g., Durkheim, 1951) 
found that Catholics tended to have lower suicide rates than 
Protestants. However, more recent normative changes among 
Catholics have lessened, or even reversed, Catholic and 
Protestant suicide rate differences. Pescosolido and 
Georgianna~a (1989) work has shifted the focus to network 
ties. Most other religion studies have examined the degree 
of religiosity rather than simple religious membership 
because the latter need not correlate closely with 
significant intervening variables such as religious belief 
and attitudes. 
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As long as social interaction is not negative, social 
involvement of all sorts reduces suicide potential; in other 
words, social isolation or living alone increases the risk of 
suicide (Bonner, 1992). For example, in one study of 
suicidal depressives versus nonsuicidal depressives, 42% of 
the suicides lived alone as opposed to only 7% of the 
nonsuicidal depressives (Maris, 1981). It should also be 
noted that suicide is the leading cause of death in jails and 
hospitals and it often occurs in large part because an inmate 
or patient is isolated from other people in the institution 
(Litman, 1992). 
Many theorists have argued that prior suicide attempts must 
be considered as a substantial risk factor. About 15% of 
nonfatal suicide attempters will die by suicide (Maris, 
1992). However, among older white males (who have the 
highest suicide rate) that attempt suicide, almost 90% die 
the first time, typically because they shoot themselves in 
the head (McIntosh, 1992). 
In summary, different disciplines study different ontological 
levels relevant to an understanding of suicide. Within 
disciplines, there are usually a number of different basic 
theoretical perspectives which emphasise different £actors or 
understanding of factors. One of the main challenges £acing 
suicide studies is to resist the fragmentation of 
disciplines, theoretical perspectives, reductionisms and 
over-emphasised £actors in order to grasp suicide as a 
holistic phenomenon. This brings us to the fifth research 
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question formulated in chapter one: is it possible to develop 
an integrated overall theory of suicide? In order to examine 
this question, it is important to consider the different 
levels of theory. The discussion of this in the next chapter 




DISTAL AND PROXIMAL 
FACTORS AND DIFFERENT 
LEVELS OF THEORY 
In order to make more sense of the various explanatory 
factors relevant to suicide, it is useful to consider the 
notions of distal and proximal (Alessi, 1992; Reber, 1985; 
Ward and Hudson, in press). This distinction is also useful 
in the consideration of different levels of theory. Ward and 
Hudson (in press) present distal and proximal factors as 
opposites of a continuum. Identifying whether a causal 
factor is distal or proximal is therefore essentially a 
matter of degree. Distal factors constitute predispositional 
or vulnerability causal factors. Developmental experiences 
and genetic inheritance are considered to be the primary 
source from which distal factors originate. The role of 
distal causal factors identifies relevant learning or genetic 
processes, from which a theory then attempts to identify 
their psychological consequences. 
Proximal causal £actors may be defined as the actual 
triggering event or triggering process. Proximal factors 
emerge from the existence and functioning of vulnerability 
factors, such as emotional and psychological states that have 
arisen primarily from the distal causal factors. In addition 
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to psychological states, contextual factors, such as the 
death of a loved one, current life stressors or alcohol and 
drug abuse may also serve as the igniting element or trigger 
for, for example, suicide. 
Following Ward and Hudson (in press), an example is developed 
to illustrate the nature and relationship between distal and 
proximal factors in suicide. In early childhood, an 
individual experiences a significant loss or may be sexually 
abused. It may also be that there is a family history of 
depression. As a result of these distal £actors, the 
individual develops an ineffective coping style, that is, one 
that is not versatile or flexible. Consequently, there is an 
inability to adapt to varying stressful life events which may 
be encountered. A continued ineffective coping style and 
lowered problem solving ability may result in a lack of 
emotional buoyancy and resiliency. These are distal £actors, 
although further along the continuum towards proximal 
£actors, as they lead to a vulnerability to emotional 
consequences such as a loss of inner self-trust, a loss 0£ 
confidence and lowered self-esteem. There also occurs an 
erosion of hope £or the future, possibly depression, and the 
loss of a sense 0£ significance and meaning in life. These 
more proximal £actors are internal psychological states which 
are emotional consequences of vulnerability. Adverse life 
stressors such as job loss, relationship failure, legal and 
financial concerns, and drug and alcohol abuse, are all 
proximal factors which may act as triggers to the 
individual>s resort to suicide. 
One of the weaknesses 0£ the research conducted by the 
Canterbury Suicide Project to date is the lack 0£ 
conceptualisation 0£ di££erent causal factors. The points 
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made so far in this chapter offer one way in which the 
Project can clarify the meaning and role of the factors they 
investigate. 
The distinction between distal and proximal factors is also 
useful in considering the di££erent levels of theory that are 
involved in the understanding of suicide. Ward and Hudson 
(in press) re£er to four different levels of theory: micro, 
middle, comprehensive, and global. These will be discussed 
in turn, with a major digression when comprehensive theories 
are considered in order to examine Shneidman~s (1985) work. 
Micro-level theories are qualitative descriptive accounts of 
causal chains largely focusing on proximal causal factors. 
These micromodels usually specify the cognitive, behavioural, 
motivational and social factors associated with the 
phenomenon. The theories are £ine-grained in nature and are 
easily applied to individual, specific cases. 
Middle level theories aim to explain the influence of single 
causal £actors. These theories attempt to depict the 
structures and processes by which such a factor has its 
effect, and tend to focus more on distal factors. Each of 
these single £actor theories tends to centre around a core 
construct, such as social structure or abnormal problem 
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solving. Ward and Hudson (in press) argue that initially 
auch theories may be relatively general or vague, and 
essentially £unction as guiding ideas. Many 0£ the theories 
0£ suicide are middle level theories £ocusing on the 
eigni£icance of a single causal £actor. 
Comprehensive theories are described by Ward and Hudson (in 
press) as multifactor in nature. These theories tend to 
focus upon distal causal £actors, but still include reference 
to proximal causal £actors. A multifactor theory aims to 
clearly describe and specify the causal factors and examine 
the relationships between these factors. Ward and Hudson, 
point out that there is an important di££erence between a 
multi£actor theory and a theoretical framework, as the latter 
is designed to provide a loose set of constructs £ram which 
to approach empirical problems. However, unlike a 
multi£actor theory, this does not provide a detailed analysis 
0£ the relationships amongst the different causal factors or 
the varying processes. 
Many of the theories of suicide which could be said to be 
aiming to be comprehensive would appear to be under-developed 
according to the criteria set out by Ward and Hudson (in 
press). For example, most of them tend to deal with factors 
within the bounds of one discipline or sub-discipline. 
Perhaps one 0£ the most use£ul comprehensive-like theories is 
that offered by Shneidman (1985) and £or this reason it is 
examined here as an illustration. Shneidman's aim was to 
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provide a summation of the key psychological findings on the 
common internal psychological states leading to suicide. 
Shneidman identified ten commonalities which reflected his 
definition of suicide as a "multidimensional malaise in a 
needful individual'' <Shneidman, 1985, p. 203). As argued 
above, definitions of suicide are crucial to the development 
of theories of suicide. In Shneidman's case, for example, 
his definition excluded a certain type of suicide accepted in 
this study - the spy who chooses to take his or her own life 
in order not to betray an important secret. Thus Shneidman's 
third commonality, that the stimulus of suicide is 
intolerable psychological pain, is not applicable to people 
who kill themselves in response to other stimuli. 
limits the applicability of his view. 
This 
Nevertheless, Shneidman provided an excellent account of the 
common internal psychological states relevant to the vast 
majority of contemporary suicides. These states are in 
effect a set of proximal psychological vulnerability factors. 
Shneidman's achievement has included an indication of the 
relationships between these states. An account of the ten 
commonalities will be given at this point because of their 
potential contribution to a global theory of suicide, which 
is discussed below. 
1. The common purpose of suicide is to seek a solution. 
This, the £irst 0£ Shneidman's (1985) commonalities, is based 
upon the notion that suicide is not a random, pointless, or 
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purposeless act. To the sufferer, it seems to be the only 
available answer. Its purpose is to seek a solution to a 
perceived crisis - the problem 0£ overwhelming pain which has 
generated intense suffering. This notion was first 
postulated by Jean Baechler (1979) who viewed suicide as a 
response to a situation that obliges a person to take up a 
position and find a way out (see also Beck, Rush, Shaw & 
Emery, 1979; Levenson, 1974; Levenson & Neuringer, 1971; 
Orbach, Rosenheim & Hary, 1987; Pataiokaa, Clum & Luacomb, 
1979). The implication of this psychological state is that 
in order to understand suicide it is important to understand 
the problem it was intended to resolve. 
2. The common goal of suicide is the cessation of 
consciousness. Suicide may be understood not so much as a 
movement toward the idea of death, as a cessation, or the 
complete stopping of one's painful consciousness. In 
addition to unbearable pain; suicide also involves the 
individual's unwillingness to tolerate that pain, the 
decision not to endure it, combined with the active will to 
stop it. The moment that the idea of actively stopping 
consciousness occurs in the mind is considered to be the 
point at which the igniting element sets the suicidal 
scenario in motion. 
3. The common stimulus in suicide is intolerable 
psychological pain. If cessation is what the suicidal person 
is moving toward, pain is what that person is seeking to 
escape. In close analysis, suicide can be understood as a 
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combined movement toward cessation and a movement away £rom 
intolerable emotion. This intolerable pain or sense 0£ 
anguish is o£ten termed "metapain" - the pain 0£ £eeling 
pain. Several theorists state that psychological pain is 
almost always the driving £orce behind suicides and 
consequently viewed as the centre 0£ suicide (Maltsberger, 
1992; Motto, 1992; Shneidman, 1992; Yufit & Benzies, 1973). 
4. The common stressor in suicide is £rustrated 
psychological needs. The psychological pain that is central 
to suicide is driven, created by, and sustained by 
£rustrated, blocked, or thwarted psychological needs. Every 
suicide seems logical to the person who commits it. Suicide 
is not so much as an unreasonable act as it is a reaction to 
un£ulfilled psychological needs. 
Murray's (1938) list of human needs include the need £or 
achievement, affiliation, harm-avoidance, understanding, 
autonomy and counteraction. It is argued that most suicides 
usually represent a combination 0£ two or more such needs 
(e.g., Cantor, 1976; Hendin, 1965; Seiden, 1966; Tucker and 
Cantor, 1975) and there is some cross-national support for 
this (Barrett and Franke, 1970; Hendin, 1965; Lester, 1968; 
Lester, 1984; Rudin, 1968). 
5. The common emotion in suicide is helplessness-
hopelessness. It is argued that while in the suicidal state, 
there is a pervasive feeling 0£ helplessness-hopelessness. 
The suicidal person may £eel that there is nothing they can 
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do and that there is no one who could possibly help. 
Underlying all of the emotions - hostility, guilt, shame, -
is the emotion of feeling helpless-hopeless. 
These feelings of hopelessness-helplessness and powerlessness 
are often characteristics of depression (Lester, 1988). 
There are many theories of depression, of which two focus 
heavily on suicide. Seligman (1975) proposed a learned 
helplessness model of depression, in which he asserted that 
the component symptoms of depression are consequences 0£ the 
If a person having learned that outcomes are uncontrollable. 
person learns that there is no relationship between the 
action they adopt and the outcome, the result is a feeling of 
helplessness. 
Aaron Beck (1967) proposed a different model of depression in 
which a salient feature is that depressed people tend to 
accept personal responsibility for failures and negative 
outcomes. Such beliefs may in some cases approach delusional 
proportions. According to Beck, this self-blame often leads 
to desires of self-punishment. Beck (1967) has shown that 
these symptoms of depression increase with the severity of 
the depression. 
6. The common cognitive state in suicide is 
ambivalence. Freud emphasised the notion that something can 
be both A and non-A or, to put it another way, an individual 
can both love and hate the same person. Shneidman (1989) 
suggests that the prototypical suicidal state is one in which 
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an individual cuts his or her throat and cries for help at 
the same time, and is genuine in both of these acts. Many 
theorists argue that no one univalently wishes to commit 
suicide. The individual would be happy not to do it, if they 
did not have to. 
7. The common perceptual state in suicide is 
constriction. Suicide may be viewed as a more or less 
transient psychological constriction of affect and intellect. 
Synonyms for "constriction" would be "tunnelling", "focusing" 
or "narrowing" of the range of options usually available to 
that individual's consciousness when the mind is not panicked 
into dichotomous thinking. For example, the individual 
perceives that they need a magically good solution or else 
the alternative is cessation - an all or nothing mind state. 
Some have argued that considerations such as the usual life-
sustaining images 0£ loved ones are not even within the mind 
(Beck and Weishaar, 1992; Shneidman, 1992). Ideally the mind 
should be capable 0£ scanning a range of options greater than 
two to make a decision as important as taking one's life. 
Contemporary theories stem predominantly from George Kelly's 
(1955) personal construct theory in which he proposed a 
theory of the structure of the mind based upon cognitive 
(thinking) processes. His basic idea was that we attempt to 
interpret and make sense of the events that we experience. 
Our psychological processes and our behaviours are determined 
by the way in which we anticipate events. 
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At the highest level of abstraction, the person may be seen 
to have a theory of the world or, as Kelly (1955) termed it, 
a "construction system". Kelly suggested that individuals 
seek to ex~end and refine their construction system as they 
encounter more and more experiences, their aim being to try 
to make more accurate predictions for future events. In this 
sense Kelly's personal construct theory is a growth-oriented 
theory in which a person becomes more skilled in making sense 
of their world. 
In 1961 Kelly wrote specifically on suicide. He first 
stressed that suicide, like most of the other behaviours of a 
person, was an attempt to validate their life. He suggested 
that the suicide will be consistent with the person's 
construct system and serve to reinforce the particular theory 
that the person has adopted. Secondly, he noted that the 
suicide will occur when the future is anticipated to be 
unpleasant and painful, a fatalism which causes the 
individual to lose sight of any hope (Kelly, 1961). Kelly's 
third point stated that suicide, like depression, was an act 
of extreme constriction. In constriction, the person shrinks 
his or her world to a manageable size. Kelly viewed the 
difference between a depressed person and a suicidal one as 
related to the degree of the constriction that occurs, such 
as withdrawing from certain activities as opposed to 
withdrawing from absolutely everything, as in cessation. 
Research following on from Kelly's ideas, investigated 
whether suicidal people have a tendency to think in terms of 
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absolute value dichotomies. Thia tendency would result in 
the individual polarising his or her evaluations into extreme 
values, such as good versus bad or right versus wrong. 
Neuringer (1967) found that the suicidal people did tend to 
be more dichotomous in their thinking. A previous study by 
Neuringer (1964) showed that in addition to thinking in a 
dichotomous manner suicidal patients also behaved 
significantly more rigidly in their thinking. Patsiokas et 
al. (1979) replicated this line 0£ inquiry and also found 
suicidal people to be more rigid as compared to nonsuicidal 
psychiatric patients. 
In addition, several researchers have found that suicidal 
people are more present-oriented and have less future time 
perspective (Greaves, 1971; Neuringer, et, al., 1971; Yufit 
and Benziea, 1973). This is consistent with the notion of 
constriction, since the suicidal person would be restricting 
thoughts of the future into their conaciouanesa. 
8. The common action in suicide is escape or egression. 
Egresaion is a person's intended departure from a region 0£ 
distress. Suicide is the ultimate escape, besides which 
running away from home, quitting a job, deserting an army, 
leaving a spouse, are pale actions. However, it is wise to 
distinguish between the wish to get away and the need to stop 
it for real. The point of suicide is a radical and permanent 
change of scene, the action to effect it is to leave 
(Shneidman, 1989). 
9. The common interpersonal act in suicide is 
communication of intention. One of the most interesting 
findings from large numbers of psychological autopsies of 
clearly suicidal deaths was that there were clues to the 
impending lethal event in approximately eighty percent of 
suicidal deaths (Maris, 1992). Individuals intent on 
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committing suicide, albeit ambivalently minded about it, 
consciously or unconsciously emit signals 0£ distress, 
whimpers of helplessness, pleas £or response, opportunities 
for rescue in the usually dyadic interplay that is an 
integral part of the suicidal scenario. The common 
interpersonal act of suicide is paradoxical communication of 
intention with the usual verbal and behavioural clues 
(Shneidman, 1992). 
10. The common consistency in suicide is with life long 
coping patterns. Initially, because suicide is an act that, 
by definition, has not been committed by an individual 
before, there seems to be no precedent to it. Yet there are 
some deep consistencies with regard to lifelong coping 
patterns. Theorists such as Yufit and Bongar (1992) suggest 
that an individual may live a "suicidal career" resulting 
from an ineffective coping style which has lead to chronic 
stress that has accumulated slowly. Triggering events are 
usually not substantially different from the chronic 
stressors in the person's life. Thus, when the suicide 
threshold is crossed, friends and relatives of the person who 
commits suicide may not notice anything special going on and 
o£ten express surprise that the death occurred when it did 
(Maris, 1992). 
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These ten commonalities encapsulate a ~ide range 0£ research 
findings that have arisen out 0£ psychological studies of 
suicide. The internal psychological states described and the 
inter-relationships indicated provide a key starting point 
for a comprehensive theory focusing on proximal £actors. 
Ward and Hudson <in press) characterise comprehensive 
theories as £ocusing on distal factors. The incorporation of 
links to distal £actors within Shneidman's theory will 
increase its value in a more comprehensive understanding 0£ 
suicide. This issue will be examined in more detail below 
a£ter the discussion of the nature 0£ global theories. 
The fourth level of theory referred to by Ward and Hudson (in 
press) is that of the global. A global theory consists of an 
overarching theory composed of all previous three levels 
linked together. According to Ward and Hudson, a utopian 
global theory should be able to specify certain factors, and 
explain the mechanisms involved in their generation and 
detail their inter-relationship. 
A global theory includes both distal and proximal causal 
£actors. In the more abstract dimensions 0£ the theory, it 
should be clear how distal factors such as developmental 
variables lead to the acquisition of personality and 
behavioural characteristics that ultimately result in the 
phenomenon. It is also necessary to epeci£y the role and 
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nature of maintaining factors, and account for any escalation 
of the phenomenon in terms of frequency or severity. The 
explicit acknowledgement of any limiting factors should also 
be part of a global theory. Ultimately a global theory 
should be one theory with numerous integrated components 
which were previously separate middle level and comprehensive 
theories. 
I£ a What can we expect from a global theory of suicide? 
global theory can be developed, will it provide the 
explanation £or all suicides? According to the realists, 
psychological and social reality consists of open systems. 
Thus while it is possible to provide a theoretical account of 
significant causal factors of suicide, it is impossible to 
say exactly if someone will commit suicide and when. There 
are too many factors interacting in too complex ways and it 
is impossible to anticipate what ~ny individual will do at 
any particular time. Major studies in the prediction of 
suicide highlight this dilemma (e.g., Maris, Berman and 
Maltsberger, 1992). Furthermore, one of the major challenges 
for a global theory is to encompass the different ontological 
levels relevant to an understanding of suicide. To date, it 
has proven extremely difficult for theorists to provide a 
clear account of the relationship between these levels. 
From a positivist point of view~ scientific explanation 
depends on the discovery of relevant laws. The realists have 
criticised the positivist covering-law model of scientific 
explanation and its allied hypothetico-deductive model of 
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theory for their assumption that human behaviour is governed 
by laws (Manicas and Secord, 1983). A global theory should 
therefore not be expected to provide universal and all-
encompassing explanations. 
Furthermore, it has been argued above that different types of 
suicide require different types of explanation. Not all 
suicides are the same. A theory that attempted to be 
applicable to them all would therefore either consist of 
simply an aggregate of different theories or a highly 
generalised account of a range of causal factors which may or 
may not be relevant to any particular type of suicide. The 
latter possibility offers in effect what the realists refer 
to as a conceptual framework (Sayer, 1984). Such a 
conceptual framework provides a conceptualisation of the key 
mechanisms - factors and relationships - relevant to an 
understanding of a phenomenon. 
There has been no attempt to date to develop a global theory 
of suicide. This has largely been due to the multitude of 
factors and disciplines involved. Perhaps the closest 
attempt at a global theory are the rather tentative 
suggestions by Maris, Berman and Maltsberger (1992) at 
providing an overview of suicidology. Their overview in 
effect offers a conceptual framework in the realist sense. 
Maris, Berman and Maltsberger (1992) were attempting to 
summarise a range of concerns encountered by researchers 
dealing with the assessment and prediction of suicide. They 
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referred to their overview as a general model to guide 
research. Their views are represented in a diagram and one 
and a half pages 0£ text. The diagram is based on the four 
disciplines and a range of factors of interest in the 
understanding of assessment and prediction (see Figure 6). 
These £actors included "predisposing £actors" (distal 
£actors), "vulnerabilities" (proximal £actors on the 
continuum between distal and proximal £actors) and ''trigger 
£actors" <proximal £actors). The theorists emphasised the 
complexity, multidisciplinarity and interactive character of 
factors relevant to an understanding of suicide. They 
conceded that their theory was not sufficiently specified -
"most individuals who 'fit' the model will not complete 
suicide" (Maris, Berman and Maltsberger, 1992, p. 669). 
This, of course, reflects the contention made above about the 
difficulties, if not the impossibility, of achieving anything 
near complete explanation. 
There are at least two areas in which the general theory 
suggested by Maris, Berman and Maltsberger (1992) could be 
improved. In the first place, the approximate relative 
importance indicated for the sets of disciplinary factors 
could be disputed. For example, it could be argued that 
psychological trigger factors such as hopelessness are more 
significant relative to biochemical trigger £actors such as 
low 5-HIAA levels. Secondly, the £act that there are links 
or interactions between the four sets of disciplinary factors 
is simply stated without any elaboration. The points made 
above about the relationship between disciplines and 
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Figure 6 : A General Model 0£ Suicidal Behaviours 
••.• "Relative height 0£ the line within each domain indicates 
approximate importance 0£ those £actors at the di££erent 
stages 0£ the suicidal career." (Maris, Berman & Maltsberger, 
1 992, p. 668) • 
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ontological levels, and about the problematic nature of 
reductionistic notions 0£ causation between ontological 
levels, are not recognised. 
Research question £our asked: is it possible to develop an 
integrated overall theory 0£ suicide? It has been argued 
that a global theory is possible but only in the sense 0£ a 
conceptual £ramework, a highly generalised account 0£ a range 
of distal and proximal £actors which may or may not be 
relevant to any particular type 0£ suicide. The distal 
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£actors relevant to a person's prediapoaition to suicide 
exist at all three ontological levels - the biochemical, the 
psychological and the social. Such factors have been 
identified in the literature on suicide and many of them have 
been noted above in the discussion of the factors dealt with 
in the £our disciplines - biological, psychiatric, 
psychological and sociological. The significance of 
different distal £actors is often difficult to determine 
because different basic theoretical perspectives have tended 
to overemphasise one factor at the expense of others. 
It has been suggested that Shneidman's (1985) ten common 
internal psychological states specify a set of psychological 
proximal vulnerability factors. In the presence of proximal 
trigger factors, which may occur as events at any of the 
three ontological levels, and given the opportunity to take 
one's life (by having at hand the means to do so, for 





The first research question addressed in this thesis was that 
of the definition of suicide. In chapter two it is suggested 
that to commit suicide is to end one's own life 
intentionally. Such a definition highlights the 
intentionality of suicide and distinguishes it from 
accidental self-inflicted death. However, a three-way 
distinction has to be drawn in order to exclude a certain 
kind of intentional death from the category of suicide. In 
one instance, death can be intended as an end in itself. In 
another instance, it can be intended as a means to an end. 
In a third instance, such as that of the lifeboat martyr, 
death may not be intended at all but foreseen as a 
consequence of what else is intended. It is argued that this 
third instance does not constitute suicide because if death 
does not occur, the individual's intentions are not thwarted. 
Whereas a definition provides a sense 0£ conceptual unity and 
uniqueness, typologies indicate complexity and 
differentiation. The last half of chapter two examines 
typologi~s of suicide in order to demonstrate the variability 
within the suicide phenomenon. It is suggested throughout 
the thesis that different types of suicide differ to such an 
extent that different kinds of explanations are required. 




There exists a proliferation of theories of suicide in the 
literature. The second research question examined in the 
thesis asks why this proliferation occurs. In chapter three, 
three main sources of proliferation are identified. The 
first is the multiplexity 0£ suicide, that is, the fact that 
it is a complex phenomenon that can only be explained by 
reference to a multitude of factors. Each person who commits 
suicide follows their own pathway, although similar pathways 
can be identified. The second is the existence of different 
disciplinary approaches. Four of these are identified: 
biological, psychiatric, psychological and sociological. 
Often sub-disciplines of these four provide their own 
theories as well. The third main source is the existence of 
a range of different basic theoretical perspectives. Such 
perspectives in psychology as structuralism, functionalism, 
behaviourism, the cognitive and psychoanalytic approaches, 
and feminism all provide different ways to approach an 
understanding of psychological phenomena. Furthermore, 
different perspectives on the nature of science, theory and 
explanation exist. These different basic theoretical 
perspectives contribute to the proliferation of theories of 
suicide. 
Whether this proliferation of theories of suicide represents 
an acceptable form of theoretical pluralism or should be 
replaced by theoretical uni£ication constitutes the third 
research question of the thesis. In chapter three it is 
argued that some of the theories of suicide are complementary 
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in character. In other words, they deal with different sub-
domains of suicide, whether they be different types of 
suicide or different possible explanatory factors. 
Theoretical unification in the positivist sense would in 
effect deny the multiplexity of suicide by treating it as one 
undifferentiated domain. 
Another aspect of theoretical pluralism in the study of 
suicide arises from the application of different basic 
theoretical perspectives. Competitive theories from 
different perspectives may be offered to explain the same 
sub-domain. Theoretical unification of these theories would 
represent the authoritarian imposition of one perspective at 
the expense of others. For this reason as well as the reason 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is argued in chapter 
three that theoretical pluralism should be viewed as 
acceptable and that there are distinct limits to theoretical 
unification. 
The fourth research question asks how studies of the various 
explanatory factors have been shaped by different 
disciplinary concerns and by the assumptions of different 
basic theoretical perspectives. Chapter four provides an 
extended discussion of the factors dealt with by the four 
main disciplines active in the study of suicide. These 
disciplines have focussed on the operation of different 
factors and usually have £ailed to take into account the 
multidisciplinary character of suicide. Suicide has a number 
of ontological levels to it. The biochemical, psychological 
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and sociological levels are all intrinsic to suicide but 
disciplinary approaches tend to ignore other levels than the 
one relevant to the discipline involved. 
In chapter four, the opportunity was taken to note that 
different basic theoretical perspectives are also operative 
especially in psychology and sociology. One of the main 
challenges in the theorisation of suicide is to resist the 
fragmentation of disciplines, theoretical perspectives, 
reductionisms and over-emphasised factors in order to grasp 
suicide as a holistic phenomenon. 
The fifth research question then arises: is it possible to 
develop an integrated overall theory of suicide? In chapter 
five, the positivist understanding of a global theory is 
rejected. In the positivist view, such a theory provides a 
universal and all-encompassing explanation. It is argued 
that different explanations are required for different types 
of suicide, that human behaviour is not law-governed as the 
positivists assume, and that psychological and social reality 
consists of open systems unable to be finally determined. 
The realist sense of a global theory as a conceptual 
framework is viewed as more acceptable. Such a global theory 
consists of a highly generalised account of the range of 
distal and proximal factors which potentially are relevant to 
any particular type of suicide. The distal factors relevant 
to why a person commits suicide exist at all three 
ontological levels. It is suggested in chapter five that 
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Shneidman's (1985) ten common internal psychological states 
specify a set of psychological proximal vulnerability factors 
which are a necessary element of any global theory of suicide 
(although a problem was noted with Shneidman's third 
commonality arising out of his more restrictive definition of 
suicide). Such vulnerability £actors can lead to the act of 
suicide upon the occurrence of proximal trigger factors 
(which may also consist of events at any one of the three 
ontological levels) and in the presence 0£ the opportunity 
and means to take one's life. 
Chapter one opened with a reference to the search by Cathy 
for a satisfactory explanation £or her husband's suicide. It 
was clear to her that her husband's low self-esteem was a 
very significant contributor to his decision to take his own 
life. Low self-esteem had caused him to become dissatisfied 
with the way he was providing for his family. To Cathy, her 
husband's dissatisfaction was unjustified but it caused him 
to become depressed and moody, hopeless and helpless, and, 
eventually, to kill himself. 
However, there were two questions left in Cathy's mind: what 
was the origin of her husband's low self-esteem and why did 
he kill himself when others with low self-esteem did not? 
These two questions point to two directions of interest in 
the theorisation of suicide - the causes of psychological 
states leading to suicide and the triggers of suicide. The 
first direction leads to a consideration of a wide range of 
factors at a number 0£ different ontological levels, factors 
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that have been identi£ied in this thesis as distal in 
character. The second direction leads to a consideration of 
a range 0£ less-clearly determinable possibilities at the 
proximal pole 0£ the distal-proximal continuum. 
This account 0£ the relationship between £actors relevant to 
an understanding 0£ the suicide of Cathy's husband 
illustrates the role that theory can play in clarifying the 
complex causation 0£ suicide. The large research programme 
conducted by the Canterbury Suicide Project needs to draw 
more explicitly upon such theorisation if it is to make sense 
of the range 0£ £actors it has identi£ied as significant in 
contemporary suicide in New Zealand. 
This thesis has raised questions and suggested directions 
rather than provided answers. It has not offered a detailed 
global theory 0£ suicide. Instead, it has outlined what are 
considered to be central elements 0£ such a theory - a 
conceptual framework providing a highly generalised account 
a£ a range 0£ causal £actors which may or may not be relevant 
to any particular type 0£ suicide. A global theory of 
suicide ~ould also acknowledge open systems, recognise 
different ontological levels, and encompass the range of 
di£ferent disciplines. It would specify predisposing 
£actors, vulnerabilities and trigger £actors. Significant 
progress towards a fuller understanding of suicide depends on 
£urther theorisation along these lines. 
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